External Shocks and FX Intervention Policy in Emerging Economies

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EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND FX INTERVENTION POLICY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES*

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This Draft: December 2020

This paper discusses the role of sterilized foreign exchange (FX) interventions as a monetary policy instrument for emerging market economies in response to external shocks. We develop a model for a commodity exporting small open economy in which FX intervention is considered as a balance sheet policy induced by a financial friction in the form of an agency problem between banks and its creditors. The severity of banks' agency problem depends directly on a bank-level measure of currency mismatch. Endogenous deviations from the standard UIP condition arise at equilibrium. In this context, FX interventions moderate the response of financial and macroeconomic variables to external shocks by leaning against the wind with respect to real exchange rate pressures. Our quantitative results indicate that, conditional to external shocks, the FX intervention policy successfully reduces credit, investment, and output volatility, along with substantial welfare gains when compared to a free-floating exchange rate regime. Finally, we explore distinct generalizations of the model that eliminate the presence of endogenous UIP deviations. In those cases, FX intervention operations are considerably less effective for the aggregate equilibrium.

JEL Codes: E32, E44, E52, F31, F41.
Keywords: Foreign Exchange Intervention; External Shocks; Monetary Policy; Financial Dollarization; Financial Frictions

Emerging market economies (EMEs) face volatile external shocks that have shaped capital flows and exchange rate dynamics since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and more recently due to global financial integration. These external shocks have different fundamentals which can be summarized in terms of three main interrelated components: global demand, foreign interest rates, and commodity prices. For instance, some relatively recent global events that had significant implications for EMEs are: the global commodity boom originated by China's strong demand during the 2000s, the expansionary monetary policies in major advanced economies in response to the Global Financial Crisis, and the normalization of the Fed's accommodative monetary policy (also known as the Taper Tantrum). At the same time, these capital flows to EMEs affect domestic financial conditions and credit growth through the availability of foreign currency denominated funds.

*The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP). We thank the Financial Stability and Development Network, the Inter-American Development Bank, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs/Swiss Government (SECO), and the Central Reserve Bank of Peru for support during the different stages of this research. Specially, we are indebted to Roberto Chang, Lawrence Christiano, Paul Castillo, Carlos Montoro, Chris Limnios, Marco Ortiz, Rafael Nivin, Carlos Pereira and Haozhou Tang, for insightful discussions and comments. We also thank seminar participants at the BCRP 2019 annual conference, the WEAI 95th annual virtual conference, the BCRP research virtual seminar 2020 and the XXV Meeting of Central Bank Researchers Network. All remaining errors are ours.

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and exchange rate fluctuations, which in some cases have placed the financial system in a more fragile situation.

Many central banks, especially in EMEs, responded to these events by building FX reserves during capital inflow episodes. These central banks were considered to be in a good position to deal with capital reversals and effectively sold those accumulated reserves during capital outflow episodes. Specifically, EMEs have relied on sterilized FX interventions (i.e., official FX purchases or sales aimed at leaving domestic liquidity unaffected) to smooth out the impact of rapidly shifting capital flows and reduce exchange rate volatility while providing businesses and households with insurance against exchange rate risks. Moreover, foreign currency debt in EMEs has increased, leaving them more exposed to global financial flows; and therefore financial stability has become an important objective of FX interventions. Additionally, the mix of policy tools used by policy makers in EMEs also includes macro-prudential measures and capital controls. The effectiveness of these tools is still under debate and more research is needed to make a better assessment of these instruments as a complement to conventional interest rate policy.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a macroeconomic model to analyze FX interventions as a monetary policy tool that takes on attributes of a financial stability instrument as a response to external shocks. We define (sterilized) FX interventions, as a situation where the central bank buys/sells FX with the banking system in exchange for domestic currency-denominated bonds issued by the central bank, but in a way that offsets any change in the supply of domestic liquidity. In line with Chang (2019), we view FX intervention operations as a non-conventional monetary tool induced by the existence of financial frictions in the domestic banking sector. In particular, when the relevant financial friction binds, leverage constraints restrict banks’ balance sheet capacity and limits to arbitrage emerge together with widening interest rate spreads. Only in the financially constrained equilibrium, FX interventions affect the equilibrium real allocation, since it relaxes or tightens the financial constraint that banks face.

In our framework, FX interventions affect the economy via two mutually reinforcing effects: exchange rate stabilization and lending capacity crowding out induced by the sterilization process associated to the FX intervention policy (similar to the empirical findings of Hofmann et al. (2019)). We suggest, however, that the financial friction approach to FX interventions differs from unconventional monetary policy for closed economies in several aspects. The unconventional monetary policy literature emphasizes that the conventional instrument is active until the policy rate reaches the effective lower bound. Only in those cases, central banks might deploy balance sheet policies such as QE, LSAP, or credit policies. On the contrary, we consider that financial constraints are binding in EMEs even

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1 The existing literature have identified four main policy objectives for using FX interventions: financial stability, price stability, precautionary savings (after experiencing crisis in the 80-90s), and export competitiveness. In this paper, we focus in the first two. See Arslan and Cantú (2019), Patel and Cavallino (2019), Chamon and Magud (2019), Hendrick et al. (2019), and Chamon et al. (2019).

2 See Céspedes et al. (2014) for a discussion of recent LATAM central banks’ experiences.

3 In addition, our model considers limited participation of households with respect to foreign currency denominated bank deposits. Both, banks and households, face limits to arbitrage between domestic and foreign currency denominated assets/liabilities. The relevance of each friction for the effectiveness of FX intervention policy is discussed in Section 5.

4 See Céspedes et al. (2017), Chang (2019), and Céspedes and Chang (2019) for similar frameworks that introduce FX interventions as an unconventional policy tool.
in normal times. Consequently, we argue that for EMEs inflation targeters, FX interventions might be considered a balance sheet policy that is active in normal times, as well as during credit crunch or sudden stop episodes. Contrary to Chang (2019), we suggest that what really matters in EMEs is how tight financial constraints are and not necessarily if those constraints bind.

We build a general equilibrium model for a commodity exporting small open economy where FX intervention operations are relevant for the equilibrium allocation. In our framework, the central bank follows a Taylor rule to set its monetary policy rate (conventional monetary policy) but also “leans against the wind” in response to exchange rate fluctuations. The model is an extension of Aoki et al. (2018) (henceforth ABK) where banks face an agency problem that constrains their ability to obtain funds from domestic households and international financial markets. Like in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler et al. (2012), and Gertler and Karadi (2013), the agency problem introduces an endogenous leverage constraint that relates credit flows to banks’ net worth and ultimately makes the balance sheet of the banking sector a critical determinant of the cost of credit faced by borrowers. In this context, unconventional monetary policies or balance sheet policies, such as FX intervention, have real effects.

Our model departs from ABK in three key aspects. First, the banking system is partially dollarized on both sides of its balance sheet and exposed to potential currency mismatches and sudden exchange rate depreciations as it is the case in many EMEs that show a high degree of vulnerability to external shocks. Therefore, credit and deposit dollarization coexist in equilibrium as endogenous variables. On one hand, we assume that intermediate good producers must borrow in advanced from banks in order to acquire capital for production but needs a combination of domestic currency and foreign currency denominated loans to buy capital. The combination of both types of loans is achieved assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology that yields a unit measure of aggregate loan services. As a result, the asset composition of banks is given by loans in domestic and foreign currency in addition to holdings of bonds issued by the central bank for sterilization purposes. On the other hand, we assume that households are allowed to hold deposits with banks that are denominated in domestic and foreign currency. However, we introduce limits on household foreign currency denominated deposits by assuming transaction costs as a simple way to capture incomplete arbitrage.

Second, the severity of the bank’s agency problem depends directly on a measure of currency mismatch at the bank level given by the difference between dollar denominated liabilities and assets as a fraction of total assets. However, not all assets enter symmetrically into the banks’ incentive compatibility constraint that characterizes the agency problem. In particular, central bank assets are harder to divert than private loans. Third, the central bank “leans against the wind” regarding exchange rate pressures due to external shocks, but in a sterilized manner. In our setting, an FX intervention policy is a balance sheet operation that takes place when the central bank sells dollars to, or buys dollars from, the banking system in exchange for domestic currency-denominated assets. However, it does so in a way that completely offsets any change in the supply of domestic liquidity by using domestic bonds issued by the central bank.

Accordingly, the model predicts the existence of different interest rate spreads (excess returns) that limit banks’ ability to borrow. When the incentive constraint binds and
households face limited participation in foreign currency deposits, not only the return on banks’ assets exceeds the return on deposits, including the excess return to foreign currency-denominated loans, but also the return on domestic currency-denominated deposits exceeds the return on foreign currency-denominated liabilities. Consequently, when financial frictions are active, the model predicts deviations from the standard UIP condition: banks would be willing to borrow more from households and from international financial markets in foreign currency while households are unable to engage in frictionless arbitrage of foreign currency-denominated deposit returns.

In this setting, we study the transmission of external shocks on domestic financial conditions by assessing the role of FX intervention operations to “lean against the wind” with respect to exchange rate fluctuations and stabilize the response of interest rate spreads and bank lending. External shocks are transmitted to the domestic economy through changes in the exchange rate, interest rate spreads, and banks’ net worth. FX intervention policy is non-neutral when limits to arbitrage are present for banks and households. For example, a persistent commodity boom generates a domestic economic expansion that, among other things, rises commodity exports significantly. Under a free-floating regime, the exchange rate appreciation relaxes the agency problem by increasing banks net worth and intermediation capacity. Hence, after the shock, banks are less exposed to foreign currency liabilities. The latter effect is reinforced by a persistent decline in the banking system currency mismatch that relaxes the financial constraint even more. By the same token, the interest rate spreads of banks’ assets over deposits move towards inducing banks to lend more in both currencies. It is noticeable that the persistent exchange rate appreciation increases credit dollarization but reduces deposit dollarization.

When the FX intervention policy is active, the central bank builds FX reserves and allocates central bank riskless bonds to the banking system as a response to commodity booms. Given the binding agency problem, building FX reserves after a persistent increase in commodity prices significantly reduces exchange rate appreciation as well as the responses of currency mismatch and banks’ net worth. Thereby, limiting bank credit growth and the consequent expansion of macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption and investment. Besides exchange rate stabilization and its direct effects on intermediation, our framework implies an additional channel for FX interventions associated with the sterilization process. The associated sterilization operation increases the supply of central bank bonds to be absorbed by banks. The latter generates a crowding-out effect in banks’ balance sheets that reduces bank intermediation. Consequently, FX interventions present two potential transmission mechanisms in our framework, the exchange rate smoothing channel and the balance sheet substitution channel. The former channel affects the size of the currency mismatch at the bank level while the latter works through the availability of bank resources to extend loans.

We take the model to the data to quantify the transmission mechanism of external shocks and the role of FX interventions in mitigating their impact on the domestic economy. We consider commodity price shocks as described above, but also shocks on the foreign interest rate and global GDP. This exercise is intended to quantify the differences in the response of the economy to external shocks when FX interventions are activated, compared to exchange rate flexibility. We also conduct a standard welfare exercise to analyze whether FX interventions yield welfare gains in the presence of external shocks.
Recent empirical evidence show that our framework is general enough to be consistent with the experience of many EMEs facing frequent external shocks under a managed exchange rate regime along with banking systems characterized with significant financial dollarization and currency mismatch. On one hand, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2016) classify the exchange rate regime of emerging market and advanced economies based on a “de facto” criterion, and find that, more than half of the countries in their sample, adopt a non-floating exchange rate regime. Based on the same criteria, Aguirre et al. (2019) report that none of the countries that have implemented IT since 1991 have always kept a purely floating exchange rate regime. Moreover, periods during which several countries (reaching around 60% of them) where non-pure floaters coincide with events related to external fundamentals. On the other hand, Corrales and Imam (2019) examine countries from different regions using the International Financial Statistics database from 2001 to 2016 and report that households maintain 57.5 percent of their deposits in dollars, while for firms, 68.7 percent of their loans are denominated in dollars. Castillo et al. (2019) study 45 emerging market and advanced economies, excluding countries whose central bank issue a reserve currency and report that around 50 percent of the countries in their sample are classified as dollarized economies.

Our quantitative analysis uses data for the Peruvian economy since it is representative of EMEs under an inflation targeting regime with active FX intervention operations, financial dollarization, and a commodity exporter small open economy facing external shocks continuously. We consider that using data for several EMEs instead, maybe misleading since evidence also shows that there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the strategies, instruments, and tactics used to implement FX intervention policies (see Hendrick et al. (2019) and Patel and Cavallino (2019)). Therefore, we calibrate most of the parameters associated with the banking block of the model to replicate some financial steady-state targets for Peru’s banking system. The rest of the parameterization is done by matching the impulse responses of the economic model to the impulse responses implied by an SVAR model with block exogeneity under the small open economy assumption.

Quantitatively, our results suggest that, conditional on external shocks, FX intervention operations successfully reduce macroeconomic volatility relative to a free-floating regime. In particular, under a FX intervention regime, the volatility of credit, investment, and output falls by around 82, 65, and 70 percent, respectively, when compared to a flexible exchange rate regime. Then, FX interventions play the role of an external shock absorber. These stability implications are indicative that FX intervention might create significant welfare gains as a response to external shocks. Hence, we use a standard welfare analysis and find that if the central bank does not intervene in the FX market in the face of external shocks, there would be a welfare loss of 6.2 percent in consumption, given the standard parameterization of the Taylor rule for the conventional interest rate instrument.

Furthermore, we explore additional numerical experiments. We recalibrate the steady state of the model economy to be consistent with a higher steady state level for the average currency mismatch of the banking system. We consider an increase of five additional percentage points relative to our baseline calibration by targeting a lower foreign interest rate and a higher level of central bank bonds at the steady state. These two additional targets induce banks to be more exposed to potential currency mismatches. Not surprisingly, our results suggest that FX interventions are more effective when the economy is calibrated to be consistent with a higher level of currency mismatch at the steady state.
since banks are in a more vulnerable initial position with respect to external shocks that produce unexpected depreciations.

Then we relax three assumptions of our basic formulation of the model that may be viewed as strong and restrictive with the aim to study our setting under more general assumptions. First, we consider the case of an economy without financial dollarization where intermediate good producers borrow from banks only in domestic currency and households are not allowed to hold deposits with banks that are denominated in foreign currency. Consequently, banks lend only in domestic currency while the only source of foreign currency funding for banks comes from borrowing abroad. In the steady state equilibrium banks are more exposed to real exchange rate movements while non-financial firms as well as households are less exposed to these fluctuations. Our parametrization suggests that when the economy is not financially dollarized, FX intervention operations are still non-neutral but less effective than in the financially dollarized economy in smoothing the response of the exchange rate as well as the response of financial and macroeconomic variables to external shocks.

Second, we relax the limited participation assumption of households with respect to bank deposits denominated in foreign currency by assuming a limiting case of zero transaction costs. Consequently, household's demand for bank deposits in foreign currency is infinitely responsive to arbitrage opportunities implying that in equilibrium the UIP condition for households holds with a constant premium while the incentive compatibility constraint for banks is still binding. Our simulations show that in this case, the exchange rate smoothing channel of FX interventions is not active, nevertheless the sterilization process associated to the FX intervention operation presents a relatively small effect over financial and macroeconomic variables due to the balance sheet substitution channel. In our model, for FX interventions to affect significantly the real exchange rate and excess returns along with the aggregate equilibrium of the economy, limits to arbitrage between domestic and foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities must be present for both, households and banks.

In the last extension of the model, the severity of the bank's agency problem depends directly on an industry (aggregate) measure of currency mismatch instead than on an individual measure. In this case, banks do not internalize the effects of borrowing and lending in foreign currency on the aggregate currency mismatch of the banking system. As a result, banks are indifferent between borrowing from domestic depositors and from abroad, implying that the standard UIP condition holds without any endogenous risk premium. Notably in this case, even though the incentive constraint for banks binds the response of the real exchange rate to external shocks is the same under FX interventions and exchange rate flexibility. This result differs from Céspedes et al. (2017) and Chang (2019) where FX interventions are irrelevant only when the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind. In this extension, the associated sterilization operation generates negligible real effects for several macroeconomic variables relative to our baseline case. Thus, in terms of macroeconomic variables different from the real exchange rate, FX interventions are less effective in this case since the exchange rate smoothing channel is muted. Our result is due to the indeterminacy of banks’ liability composition that occurs when banks do not internalize the effect of currency mismatch over financial constraints. Furthermore, we simulate an exogenous purchase of FX reserves under the last two extensions of the model and find that FX interventions are irrelevant for real exchange rate dynamics even when the incen-
tive compatibility constraint binds.

Finally, we compare the performance of our FX intervention policy with an alternative policy that implements a managed float by using the policy interest rate as the unique monetary instrument. The latter policy is characterized by an extended Taylor rule where the policy interest rate responds not only to inflation and the output gap, but also to deviations of the real exchange rate with respect to its steady state value. Our findings suggest that when the central bank uses the policy rate to smooth exchange rate fluctuations, it leads to exchange rate and financial stabilization at the expense of real destabilization, especially of investment. This result suggest that sterilized FX intervention may be important as an additional independent instrument available to the central bank under certain conditions.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the literature related to FX interventions in macroeconomic models. Section 2 describes the general equilibrium model with a special emphasis in the financial system and the implementation of FX interventions. Section 3 presents the parametrization strategy, including the specification and identification assumptions for the SVAR model. The main results are shown in Section 4. Section 5 studies the effects of external shocks on some generalizations of our basic formulation of the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes with some final remarks.

1 Brief Literature Review

Pioneered by Kouri (1976), Branson et al. (1977), and Henderson and Rogoff (1982), the first strand of this literature emphasizes the portfolio balance channel, which indicates that, when domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, FX intervention is an additional and effective central bank tool. This is because it can change the relative stock of assets and with it the exchange rate risk premium that affects arbitrage possibilities between the rates of return of domestic currency denominated assets and foreign currency denominated assets. However, the models built during this stage were characterized by a lack of solid micro-foundations, preventing a rigorous normative analysis. Additional research studies within the portfolio balance approach without micro-foundations are Krugman (1981), Obstfeld (1983), Dornbusch (1980), Branson and Henderson (1985), and Frenkel and Mussa (1985).

Relying on micro-founded general equilibrium models, the second strand of this literature states that FX interventions have no effect on equilibrium prices and quantities. The seminal work using this approach is Backus and Kehoe (1989), which not only studies the effectiveness of this kind of intervention in complete markets, but also considering some types of market incompleteness. It points out that, when portfolio decisions are frictionless, the imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets postulated by the portfolio balance channel is not enough for FX interventions to affect prices and quantities in the general equilibrium. After the publication of this work, academia adopted a pessimistic view with respect to the effectiveness of FX interventions, creating a long-lasting dissonance with policy practice since policy-makers have ignored the recommendations.
from research and have intervened, frequently and intensely, in the FX market.

Recently, there has been a resurgence in academic interest in assessing the relevance of FX interventions based on micro-founded macroeconomic models. In this regard, the portfolio balance approach has experienced a recent comeback in studies such as Kumhof (2010), Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), Liu and Spiegel (2015), Benes et al. (2015), Montoro and Ortiz (2016), Cavallino (2019), and Castillo et al. (2019). Some of these studies rely on a reduced form type of friction while others assume more structure when addressing the relevance of FX interventions. This literature argues that FX intervention can affect the exchange rate when domestic and external assets are imperfect substitutes. In this case, FX intervention increases the relative supply of domestic assets, driving the risk premium up and creating exchange rate depreciation pressures.

A third strand of the literature is the so-called financial intermediation view of FX interventions. The general equilibrium relevance of FX interventions rely on a financial friction of the type associated with the literature on unconventional monetary policy in closed economies. Specifically, this literature assumes that banks face an agency problem that constrains their ability to obtain funds from abroad. Céspedes et al. (2017) and Chang (2019) build models for an open economy with domestic banks subject to occasionally binding collateral constraints and find that FX interventions have an impact on macroeconomic aggregates only when the relevant financial constraint is binding. When financial markets are frictionless, domestic banks are able to accommodate FX interventions by borrowing less or more from domestic depositors as well as from foreign financial markets. In the latter case, the general equilibrium is left undisrupted. Additionally, Fanelli and Straub (2019) find that including a pecuniary externality in partially segmented domestic and foreign bond markets results in an excessively volatile exchange rate response to capital inflows, thereby making FX interventions desirable.

Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of FX interventions has been particularly difficult to find because of endogeneity problems that make it difficult to identify its effects, especially on the exchange rate. While individual country studies report mixed results on the effectiveness of FX intervention, in general cross-country studies find some effectiveness in curbing financial conditions and exchange rate dynamics (see Ghosh et al. (2018), Villamizar-Villegas and Perez-Reyna (2017), and Fratzscher et al. (2018). Recent empirical findings have shed some light on how FX intervention reduces the impact of capital flows on domestic financial conditions. For instance, Blanchard et al. (2015) show that capital flow shocks have significantly smaller effects on exchange rates and capital accounts in countries that intervene in FX markets on a regular basis. According to Hofmann et al. (2019), FX intervention has two mutually reinforcing effects. On one hand, in periods of easing global financial conditions, FX can be used to lean against the increase in bank lending after a dollar appreciation (the risk-taking channel of the exchange rate). On the other hand, there is a “crowding out” effect of bank lending associated to the sterilization process of the FX intervention, which increases the supply of domestic bonds absorbed by banks. The aggregate impact of FX interventions results from the mix of these two effects. By curbing domestic credit, FX intervention will have an impact on the real economy.
2 A General Equilibrium Model

We build a medium-scale small open economy New Keynesian model extended with banks, FX interventions, and a commodity sector. Following ABK, banks are allowed to finance their assets using two kinds of liabilities: domestic deposits and foreign borrowing from international financial markets. Nevertheless, banks lend not only in domestic currency but also in FX. FX intervention is introduced to study the role of this tool in financial intermediation, macroeconomic stabilization, and exchange rate volatility.

The rest of the model follows very closely the standard small open economy New Keynesian framework with the exception of two main features. First, we introduce an endogenous commodity sector to analyze the effect of commodity booms and busts in domestic financial conditions. The representative commodity producer accumulates its own capital facing standard capital adjustment costs and does not need external funding or any form of borrowing to produce. Second, we assume that intermediate good producers must borrow from banks before producing. In addition, we assume that intermediate good producers demand a bundle of loans consisting of a combination of domestic and foreign currency denominated loans according to a loan services technology that aggregates both types of loans. Further details about the model are presented below. For the rest of the document, small letters characterize individual variables, while capital letters denote aggregates.

2.1 The Financial System

We follow Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) to introduce a banking sector in an otherwise standard infinite horizon macroeconomic model for a small open economy. In this setting, the representative household consists of a continuum of bankers and workers of measure unity. Workers supply labor and provide labor income to their households. Workers hold deposits with banks along with private securities in the form of equity with intermediate good producers. Domestic bank deposits are denominated in domestic and foreign currency, although the latter is subject to transaction costs. Foreign agents lend to banks in foreign currency and are precluded from lending directly to non-financial firms. All financial contracts between agents are short-term, non-contingent, and thus riskless. An agency problem constraints banks’ ability to obtain funds from households and foreigners. The tightness of the financial constraint that banks face depends on a measure of currency mismatch at the individual level. In this section, we focus on bankers, while workers are described in detail in section 2.2.3.

Banks. In a given household, each banker member manages a bank until she retires with probability $1 - \sigma$. Retired bankers transfer their earnings back to households in the form of dividends and are replaced by an equal number of workers that randomly become bankers. The relative proportion of bankers and workers is kept constant. New bankers receive a fraction $\zeta$ of total assets from the household as start-up funds.

Additionally, banks provide funding to producing firms without any financial friction. Hence, the only financially constrained agents in the model are banks due to a moral
hazard problem between a bank and its depositors. Domestic and foreign currency
denominated bank loans to firms are denoted by \( l_t \) and \( l_t^* \), respectively. Bank assets are
also made up of central bank bonds (\( b_t \)) considered to be the only financial instruments
used in the associated sterilization process of any FX intervention. Bank investments
are financed by domestic currency-denominated household deposits (\( d_t \)), by foreign
currency-denominated household deposits (\( d_t^* \)), by foreign borrowing (\( d_t^{*,f} \)), or by using
banks’ own net worth (\( n_t \)). A bank’s balance sheet expressed in real terms is

\[
l_t + e_t l_t^* + b_t = n_t + d_t + e_t (d_t^{*,h} + d_t^{*,f})
\]

where \( e_t \) is the real exchange rate. Table 1 illustrates the typical balance sheet of a bank in
the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( l_t )</td>
<td>( d_t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( e_t l_t^* )</td>
<td>( e_t (d_t^{<em>,h} + d_t^{</em>,f}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b_t )</td>
<td>( n_t )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We assume that \( d_t^{*,h} \) and \( d_t^{*,f} \) are perfect substitutes for bankers and \( d_t^* \) denotes total
deposits/funding in foreign currency. Net worth is accumulated through retained earn-
ings and it is defined as the difference between the gross return on assets and the cost of
liabilities:

\[
n_{t+1} = R^b_{t+1} l_t + R^{ls}_{t+1} e_t l_t^* + R^b_{t+1} b_t - R_{t+1} d_t - e_{t+1} R^*_{t+1} d_t^* \tag{2}
\]

where \( \{R^b_{t}, R^{ls}_{t}, R^*_{t}\} \) denote the real gross returns to the bank from central bank bonds, do-
mestic currency-denominated loans, and foreign currency-denominated loans, respectiv-
ely. Similarly, \( R_t \) and \( R^*_t \) are the real gross interest rate paid by the bank on domestic and
foreign currency-denominated liabilities, respectively.\(^6\)

**Agency Problem.** With the purpose of limiting banks’ ability to raise domestic and
foreign funds, we assume that at the beginning of the period, bankers may choose to divert
funds from the assets they hold and transfer the proceeds to their own households. If bank
managers operate honestly, then assets will be held until payoffs are realized in the next
period and repay their liabilities to creditors (domestic and foreign). On the contrary, if
bank managers decide to divert funds, then assets will be secretly channeled away from
investment and consumed by their households. In this framework, it is optimal for bank
managers to retain earnings until exiting the industry. Bankers’ objective is to maximize
the expected discounted stream of profits that are transferred back to the household; i.e.,

\(^5\)Households face limited participation in asset markets when saving in foreign currency and holding
equity. Limited participation appears in terms of a marginal transaction cost for managing sophisticated
portfolios.

\(^6\)All real interest rates are ex-post. Along these lines, \( R_t \) equals \( \frac{1+i_t}{1+n_t} \) where \( i_t \) is the nominal policy rate.
its expected terminal wealth, given by

\[ V_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+j} \sigma^{j-1}(1 - \sigma)n_{t+j} \right] \]

where \( \Lambda_{t,t+j} \) is the stochastic discount factor of the representative household from \( t+j \) to \( t \) and \( \mathbb{E}_t[.] \) is the expectation operator conditional on information set at \( t \). Notice that using \( \Lambda_{t,t+j} \) to properly discount the stream of bank profits means that households effectively own the banks that their banker members manage. Bank managers will abscond funds if the amount they are capable to divert exceeds the continuation value of the bank \( V_t \). Accordingly, for creditors to be willing to supply funds to the banker, any financial arrangement between them must satisfy the following incentive constraint:

\[ V_t \geq \Theta(x_t) \left[ l_t + \omega^* e_t l_t^* + \omega^b b_t \right] \quad (3) \]

where \( \Theta_t(x) \) is assumed to be strictly increasing\(^7\) and \( x_t \) is the currency mismatch measure at the bank level defined and discussed below. We assume that some assets are more difficult to divert than others. Specifically, a banker can divert a fraction \( \Theta(x_t) \) of domestic currency loans, a fraction \( \Theta(x_t) \omega^* \) of foreign currency loans, and a fraction \( \Theta(x_t) \omega^b \) of the total amount of central banks bonds, where \( \omega^*, \omega^b \in [0, \infty) \). For instance, whenever \( \omega^b = 0 \), bankers cannot divert sterilized bonds and buying them does not tighten the incentive constraint. Therefore, a fraction of the interest rate spread on \( b_t \) may be arbitraged away, leaving \( R_t^b \) lower than \( R_t^l \). In our setting, the three type of assets held by banks do not enter with equal weights into the incentive constraint, reflecting that for some assets the constraint on arbitrage is weaker. We calibrate \( \omega^* \), and \( \omega^b \) to match the average gross returns for each asset type in the Peruvian economy. In Section 3, we show that those targets are consistent with the fact that central bank bonds are much harder to divert than loans; i.e., the calibrated \( \omega^b \) is very close to zero. In Section 5 we relax this assumption and assume that all assets enter the incentive constraint with equal weights.

We assume that the banker’s ability to divert funds depends on the currency mismatch size at the bank level expressed as a fraction of total assets. In this regard, we define \( x_t \) to be:

\[ x_t = \frac{e_t d_t^* - e_t l_t^*}{l_t + e_t l_t^* + b_t} \quad (4) \]

A higher currency mismatch size at the bank level implies that bankers are able to divert a higher fraction of their assets, ultimately increasing the severity of the incentive constraint. In this regard, \( x_t \) measures the exposure of the bank’s balance sheet to abrupt exchange rate movements and foreign capital reversals. A significant currency mismatch degree in a bank’s balance sheet places it in a more vulnerable position with respect to external shocks, particularly shocks generating unexpected depreciations. From this perspective, and as long as the incentive constraint is binding, an increase in \( x_t \) will require an increase in \( V_t \), to keep domestic depositors and foreign lenders willing to continue

\(^7\)Specifically, we use the following convex function:

\[ \Theta(x) = \theta \left( 1 + \frac{x}{2} \right) \]
lending funds to a bank. In the basic formulation of the model, we assume that $x_t$ is internalized by each bank. In Section 5, we assume that $x_t$ is external to an individual bank representing an aggregate currency mismatch measure of the banking system as a whole.

Figure 1 plots the empirical counterpart for both, the evolution of foreign currency liabilities and the currency mismatch level of Peru’s banking system. The latter is also known as the FX spot or countable net position of a bank without taking into account FX derivatives. Foreign currency deposits, including external credit lines, expressed as a fraction of total assets, have been steadily decreasing since 2001, from an average of 79.9% during 2001-2008 to an average of 54.2% from 2009 to 2018. This is also the case for the empirical measure of currency mismatch which also shows a markedly decreasing trend from 2001 to 2008 with an average of 23 percent. From 2009 to 2018, it has been fluctuating around 17.2% without showing a clear trend. In Section 3, we use this data set to discipline the model.

**Figure 1. Foreign Deposits and Currency Mismatch, %**

![Figure 1](image)

On the other hand, Figure 2 plots the evolution of the empirical counterpart of the currency mismatch level of Peru’s banking system and compares it with empirically calculated UIP deviations from January 2002 to December 2019. From the point of view of the banking system, UIP deviations are defined as the interest rate spread of domestic currency deposits relative to foreign borrowing or foreign credit lines, $\mathbb{E}_t [R_t - e_{t+1} R^* / e_t]$. Although the dynamics of the empirical currency mismatch level may respond to different economic fundamentals, it exhibits a positive correlation with UIP deviations. In our model, this correlation comes from the assumption that the currency mismatch at the

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8 We calibrate the consolidated balance sheet of the banking system in the model using data for Peru to obtain historical averages for the aggregate currency mismatch level and foreign currency liabilities as a fraction of total assets. We use data on domestic currency credit for $L_t$, foreign currency - denominated liabilities for $L^*_t$, and total banking investments for $B_t$. Additionally, we use data on banks’ net worth for $N_t$ and the sum of foreign currency deposits and external liabilities for measuring $D^*_t$.

9 Since Peru is representative of a commodity exporting emerging market economy under an inflation targeting regime with active FX intervention policy and financial dollarization, we mainly use Peruvian data for our quantitative analysis.
bank level, determines the severity of the incentive constraint faced by banks, i.e., \( \partial_x \Theta(x) > 0 \) for all \( x > 0 \), as assumed at the steady-state. Moreover, in the model and under certain assumptions, the FX intervention policy affects the dynamics of the real exchange rate, the currency mismatch as well as the magnitude and persistence of UIP deviations, ultimately reducing the aforementioned correlation together with the corresponding volatility. In line with the theoretical predictions of our model, we expect the correlation between the currency mismatch at the bank level and UIP deviations to be positively strong under flexible exchange rates but weak under an FX intervention regime.

**Figure 2. Currency Mismatch and UIP Deviation, %**

Bank's Recursive problem. Given a function \( \Theta(x) \), a vector of interest rates, government policies, and \( n_t \) (state variable), each bank chooses its balance sheet components \( (l_t, l^*, b_t, d_t, d^*_t) \) to maximize the franchise value:

\[
V_t = \max_{l_t, l^*_t, b_t, d_t, d^*_t} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left\{ (1 - \sigma) n_{t+1} + \sigma V_{t+1} \right\} \right]
\]

subject to (1), (2), (3), and (4).

A bank's objective function as well as its balance sheet and the incentive constraint it faces, can be expressed as a fraction of net worth. Moreover, using the definition of \( x_t \), a bank's problem can be written in terms of choosing each of the assets it holds as a fraction of net worth together with the optimal size of its currency mismatch \( x_t \). Consequently, the bank's problem is to choose \( (\phi_t, \phi^*_t, \phi^b_t, x_t) \) to maximize its value as a fraction of net worth:

\[
\psi_t = \max_{\phi^l_t, \phi^*_t, \phi^b_t, x_t} \mu^l_t \phi^l_t + (\mu^l_t + \mu^d_t) \phi^*_t + \mu^b_t \phi^b_t + \mu^d_t \left( \phi^l_t + \phi^*_t + \phi^b_t \right) x_t + v_t
\]

subject to:

\[
\psi_t - \Theta(x_t) \left[ \phi^l_t + \omega^* \phi^*_t + \omega^b \phi^b_t \right] \geq 0
\]

where \( \psi_t = \frac{V_t}{n_t}, \phi_t = \frac{l_t}{n_t}, \phi^*_t = \frac{l^*_t}{n_t}, \phi^b_t = \frac{b_t}{n_t}, v_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} R_{t+1} \right], \) and

\[
\mu^l_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} \left( R^l_{t+1} - R_{t+1} \right) \right]
\]
\[ \mu^*_{t} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} \left( \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} R^*_{t+1} - R_{t+1} \right) \right] \]
\[ \mu^b_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} \left( R^b_{t+1} - R_{t+1} \right) \right] \]
\[ \mu^d_{t} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1} - \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} R^*_{t+1} \right) \right] \]

\( \Omega_{t+1} \) is the shadow value of a unit of net worth to the bank at \( t + 1 \), given by

\[ \Omega_{t+1} = \lambda_{t,t+1} (1 - \sigma + \sigma \psi_{t+1}) \]

Let \( \lambda^b_t \) be the Lagrangian multiplier for the incentive constraint faced by the bank, eq. (6). Then, the first order conditions are characterized by the slackness condition associated to eq. (6) and: 10

\[ \mu^l_t + \mu^d_{t} x_t = \frac{\lambda^b_t}{1 + \lambda^b_t} \Theta(x_t) \]  
(7)
\[ \mu^{l*}_{t} + \mu^d_{t} (1 + x_t) = \frac{\lambda^b_t}{1 + \lambda^b_t} \omega^* \Theta(x_t) \]  
(8)
\[ \mu^b_t + \mu^d_{t} x_t = \frac{\lambda^b_t}{1 + \lambda^b_t} \omega^b \Theta(x_t) \]  
(9)
\[ \mu^d_{t} \left( \phi_t^l + \phi^{l*}_{t} + \phi_t^b \right) = \frac{\lambda^b_t}{1 + \lambda^b_t} \left( \phi_t^l + \omega^* \phi^{l*}_{t} + \omega^b \phi_t^b \right) \frac{\partial \Theta(x_t)}{\partial x} \]  
(10)

When the incentive constraint is not binding, then \( \lambda^b_t = 0 \), the discounted excess returns or interest rate spreads are zero. Consequently, under this equilibrium, financial markets are frictionless implying that the standard arbitrage condition holds: banks will acquire assets to the point where the discounted return on each asset equals the discounted cost of deposits (i.e., \( \mu^i_t = \mu^{l*}_t = \mu^b_t = 0 \)). In addition, there is no cost advantage of foreign borrowing over domestic deposits (i.e., \( \mu^d_{t} = 0 \), the UIP conditions holds).

When the incentive constraint is binding, \( \lambda^b_t > 0 \), banks are restricted to obtain funds from creditors. In this context, limits to arbitrage emerge in equilibrium, leading to interest rate spreads. It is important to highlight that excess returns increase depending on how tightly the incentive constraint binds. The latter is measured by \( \lambda^b_t \) and ultimately depends on \( x_t \). The intuition behind the above first-order conditions is that banks invest in each asset to the point where the marginal benefit of acquiring an additional unit of each asset is equal to its marginal cost. The marginal benefit of each asset is composed by its own discounted excess value and the excess value associated with the advantage cost of funding it via foreign borrowing, which is ultimately influenced by the size of the currency mismatch11. For instance, a fraction \( x_t \) of an extra unit of \( l_t \) or \( b_t \) is funded by \( d^*_t \). Similarly, a portion \( 1 + x_t \) of an additional investment in \( l^*_t \) is financed by \( d^*_t \); i.e., banks use more foreign currency funds and less home deposits per unit of foreign currency loans.

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10 A complete derivation of the bank’s optimality conditions are presented in Appendix C.1.
11 Note that the marginal benefit for each asset can be rewritten in terms of interest rate spreads as

\[ \mu^l_t + \mu^d_{t} x_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} \left( R^l_{t+1} - \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} R^*_{t+1} x_t + R_{t+1} (1 - x_t) \right) \right] \]
On the other hand, the marginal cost associated with each asset is given by the marginal cost of tightening the incentive constraint times the total share of the asset that the bank may actually divert.

Limits to arbitrage emerge from the restriction that the incentive constraint places on the size of a bank’s portfolio relative to its net worth. A form of leverage ratio for a bank can be obtained by combining eq. (5), eq. (6), and the above first order conditions,

$$\Phi_t n_t \geq l_t + \omega^e e_t l_t^* + \omega^b b_t$$

$$\Phi_t = \frac{v_t}{\Theta(x_t) - (\mu^l_t + \mu^d_t x_t)}$$

(Gertler and Karadi (2013) argued that $\Phi_t$ can be interpreted as the maximum ratio of weighted assets to net worth that a bank may hold without violating the incentive constraint. The weight applied to each asset is the proportion of the asset that the bank is able to divert.)

When the incentive constraint binds, the weighted leverage ratio $\Phi_t$ is increasing in two factors: 1) the savings of deposit costs from another unit of net worth given by $v_t$; and 2) the discounted marginal benefit of lending in domestic currency. As discussed in Gertler et al. (2012), both factors raise the value of a bank, thereby making its creditors willing to lend more. The leverage ratio also varies inversely with exchange risk perceptions ultimately associated to fluctuations on $x_t$: whenever the currency mismatch rises, bankers are more exposed to real exchange movements and its creditors restrict external funding. Notice that in a closed economy setting, $\mu_t^{d*}$ is zero and $\Phi_t$ constant. In this case, eq. (12) converges to the setup for a bank’s leverage ratio proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2013).

The leverage ratio can be expressed as a collateral constraint consistent with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) as follows:

$$l_t \leq \theta_t n_t \quad \text{and} \quad \theta_t = \Phi_t - \omega^e \phi_t^* - \omega^b \phi_t^b$$

where $\phi_t^e = \frac{e_t^b}{e_t^*}$ and $\phi_t^b = \frac{b_t}{e_t^*}$. Recently, Céspedes et al. (2017) and Chang (2019) use similar collateral constraints to capture foreign debt limits faced by EME domestic banks. However, in our more general framework, $\theta_t$ is not a parameter but an endogenous variable that depends on a currency mismatch measure at the bank level. In our setting, similar collateral constraints for $l_t^*$ and $b_t$ can be obtained straightforwardly.

To wrap out, in our model, the non-neutrality result of FX intervention policy for the general equilibrium allocation is a consequence of the following deviation of the UIP equation:

$$\mathbb{E}_t \Omega_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1} - \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} R_{t+1}^* \right) = \frac{\lambda_t^b}{1 + \lambda_t^b} \left( l_t + \omega^e e_t l_t^* + \omega^b b_t \right) \frac{d\Theta(x_t)}{dx_t}$$

Then, it is clear that $x_t$ directly influences the fraction of each asset financed by foreign currency borrowing.
For FX interventions to affect significantly real exchange rate dynamics, limits to arbitrage between domestic and foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities must be present, i.e., \( \lambda^b_t > 0 \). However, this is only a necessary condition. If \( \lambda^b_t > 0 \), but banks do not internalize the effects of the currency mismatch on the severity of the agency problem (i.e., \( \Theta \) depends on an aggregate measure of currency mismatch implying that \( \frac{d\Theta(x)}{dx} = 0 \)), then expected UIP deviations are equal to zero and FX interventions barely affect real exchange rate dynamics. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, even with \( \frac{d\Theta(x)}{dx} = 0 \), FX operations could affect the macroeconomic allocation through its effects on the bank’s balance sheet, as long as \( \lambda^b_t > 0 \). The relevance of these assumptions over the effectiveness of FX interventions are explored in more detail in Section 5.

2.2 The Central Bank and FX Interventions

The related literature on FX intervention (for example, Chang (2019)) agrees in defining it as the following situation: whenever a central bank sells or buys FX and at the same time it also buys or sells an equivalent amount of domestic currency-denominated securities. Under this policy, the central bank’s net credit position changes. Without sterilization, buying or selling FX would directly affect the supply of domestic liquidity. The latter implies difficulties in meeting the central bank’s interbank interest rate target, which ultimately is determined by a Taylor rule. Nevertheless, there is less agreement in the literature about the implementation of the sterilization leg of an FX intervention. This reflects differences in FX intervention practices among central banks.

In our framework, the sterilization operations associated with an FX intervention are implemented by changing the supply of central bank bonds in the banking system. Recall that central bank bonds are riskless one-period bonds issued by the monetary authority. Accordingly, FX intervention denotes the following: if the central bank buys (sells) FX, for example dollars, from (to) the domestic banking system, a simultaneous raise (fall) in official FX reserves would occur. At the same time, the central bank will completely offset the effect on domestic liquidity by issuing (retiring) central bank bonds to (from) the banking system. The central bank’s balance sheet is given by

\[
B_t = e_t F_t
\]

where \( B_t \) denotes central bank bonds and \( F_t \) official FX reserves. Notice that eq. (14) serves both as a sterilization rule and as accounting identity for the central bank’s balance sheet. In this setting, FX interventions induce the central bank to produce operational losses or a quasi-fiscal deficit, since it is assumed that official FX reserves are invested abroad at the foreign interest rate \( R^*_t \), while central bank bonds pay \( R^b_t \). Then, the central bank’s quasi-fiscal deficit is:

\[
CB_t = \left( \tau^{fx} + R^b_t - \frac{e_t}{e_{t-1}} R^*_t \right) B_{t-1}
\]

where \( \tau^{fx} \) measures a inefficiency cost for FX intervention which plays a main role in the welfare analysis of the model (see Section 4.3). As long as \( R^b_t > R^*_t \), the central bank produce operational losses associated with the sterilization process, which ultimately represent the
fiscal costs of FX interventions. We assume that any operational losses are transferred to the central government and financed through lump sum taxes on households.

Furthermore, in addition to the standard policy rate rule, the central bank implements the following FX intervention rule written in terms of the supply of central bank bonds responding to exchange rate deviations from its steady-state value:

\[
\ln B_t = \ln B - v_e (\ln e_t - \ln e^\alpha)
\]

with \(v_e \geq 0\) measure the intensity with which FX interventions respond to exchange rate movements. The steady-state level of central bank bonds is denoted by \(B\). Under this rule, the central bank sells official FX reserves in response to a real depreciation (i.e., whenever the real exchange rate is above its steady state value). As mentioned before, the counterpart of selling reserves is to withdraw central bank bonds from banks’ balance sheet, eq. (14). Consequently, FX interventions present two potential transmission mechanisms in our framework: 1) when selling official FX reserves to the banking system, the exchange rate is stabilized; and 2) when sterilizing the effect over domestic liquidity, the central bank frees resources from domestic banks to extend additional loans to firms. Moreover, the exchange rate stabilization effect potentially affects the size of the currency mismatch size at the bank level. For instance, ceteris paribus, stabilizing a depreciation pressure on the exchange rate may lead to reducing the currency mismatch size at the bank level. If this is the case, the incentive constraint (more specifically, its degree of tightening) may be relaxed even further, thereby further stimulating domestic financial conditions.

One key aspect of our model is that FX interventions are relevant for determining the general equilibrium allocation only when the incentive constraint binds, as in Céspedes et al. (2017) and Chang (2019). Whenever the incentive constraint is not binding, financial markets are frictionless, meaning there is no leverage constraint for banks nor interest rate spreads. Therefore, balance sheet policies such as FX interventions are irrelevant, since the size and composition of balance sheets, for both the banking system and the central bank, do not matter for equilibrium. In particular, under frictionless financial markets, the sterilization process associated with FX interventions does not have real effects: the exchange rate, as well as domestic financial conditions, are determined without any consideration of balance sheets. More important, in our framework, and in contrast with Chang (2019), domestic banks can accommodate the central bank’s FX reserve accumulation during “normal” times (non-binding incentive constraint) by increasing domestic deposits, foreign borrowing, or both, since banks are indifferent between domestic-currency or foreign currency funding. Therefore, when the incentive constraint is not binding and the central bank accumulates FX reserves it does not necessarily mean that banks will end up more exposed to foreign currency-denominated liabilities. Furthermore, in Section 5, we consider an extension of our baseline model where banks take as given fluctuations in \(x_t\). In this case, banks consider domestic deposits and foreign borrowing as perfect substitutes, the UIP condition holds with equality and FX interventions are irrelevant for exchange rate dynamics even though the incentive constraint binds.

We consider that for EME’s, financial constraints are always binding, even in “normal” times. The difference between normal times and a financial crisis is how tight financial constraints bite. In our framework, the degree of financial constraint tightening depends on the currency mismatch size in banks’ balance sheets, which ultimately responds to
external shocks. In this context, FX interventions are meant to be an additional central bank instrument aimed to smooth the response of domestic financial conditions to external shocks via exchange rate stabilization.

2.3 Households

Workers supply labor and take labor income to their household. Households use labor income and profits from firm ownership to consume non-commodity goods, save by holding private securities issued by intermediate good producers along with bank deposits. As already mentioned, bank deposits by households are denominated in domestic and foreign currency. We assume that households face increasing transactions costs when holding equity along with foreign currency-denominated bank deposits. The latter assumption prevents frictionless arbitrage due to limited ability to manage sophisticated portfolios. Finally, in line with standard literature on financial and labor market frictions, it is assumed that within each household there is perfect consumption insurance to keep the representative agent assumption. Following Miao and Wang (2010) and Gertler et al. (2012), households’ preference structure is

\[
(1 - \beta)E_t \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \left( C_{t+j} - \mathcal{H} C_{t+j-1} - \frac{\zeta_0}{1 + \xi} H_{t+j}^{1+\xi} \right)^{1-\gamma} \right]
\]

where \( C_t \) is consumption and \( H_t \) is the labor effort in terms of hours worked. The subjective discount factor is given by \( \beta \in (0, 1) \), \( \gamma > 0 \), which measures the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, while \( \zeta_0 \) controls the dis-utility of labor. Additionally, the Frisch elasticity is mainly determined by the interaction of \( \zeta > 0 \) and the degree of internal habit formation, \( \mathcal{H} \in [0, 1) \). For instance, if there is no habit formation (i.e. \( \mathcal{H} = 0 \)), this specification abstracts from wealth effects on labor supply as in Greenwood et al. (1988), and the Frisch elasticity is \( 1/\zeta \).\(^{12}\)

Bank deposits are assumed to be one-period riskless real assets that pay a gross real return of \( R_t \) from period \( t - 1 \) to \( t \). Let \( D_t \) and \( D_t^{*,h} \) be the total quantity of domestic and foreign currency-denominated deposits, respectively. The amount of new equity acquired by the household is \( S_t \) while \( w_t \) denotes the real wage, \( R_k^{nc} \) the return on equity, \( \Pi_t \) is net payouts to the household from the ownership of both financial and non-financial firms and \( T_t \) denotes the lump-sum taxes needed to finance the central bank’s quasifiscal deficit. Hence, the household budget constraint is written as

\[
C_t + D_t + e_t \left[ D_t^{*,h} + \frac{\kappa_{D}*}{2} \left( D_t^{*,h} - \bar{D}^{*,h} \right)^2 \right] + \left[ S_t + \frac{\kappa_S}{2} \left( S_t - \bar{S} \right)^2 \right] + T_t = w_t H_t + \Pi_t + R_t D_{t-1} + R_t^{*} e_t D^{*,h}_{t-1} + R_t^{knc} S_{t-1}
\]

where \( (\kappa_{D}, \bar{D}^{*,h}) \) and \( (\kappa_S, \bar{S}) \) are parameters that control the transaction costs for \( D^{*,h}_t \) and \( S_t \), respectively. Accordingly, \( \bar{D}^{*,h} \) and \( S \) correspond to the frictionless capacity level for each asset. Consider the case where the marginal transaction cost is infinity. Then, households will hold the respective frictionless value of each asset, which is fully unresponsive

\(^{12}\)For a complete examination of the labor supply function in the general case \( \mathcal{H} \in [0, 1) \), see Appendix C.2.
to arbitrage opportunities. Notice that \( \Pi_t \) includes the net transfer to household members that become bankers at the beginning of the period, as it is written as

\[
\Pi_t = \underbrace{\Pi_t^1}_{\text{Goods Producer}} + \underbrace{\Pi_t^2}_{\text{Capital Producer}} + \underbrace{\Pi_t^c}_{\text{Commodity Sector}} + (1 - \sigma) \left[ R_t^L L_{t-1} + R_t^s e_t L^*_t R_t^b B_{t-1} - R_t D_{t-1} - R_t^s e_t D^*_t \right] + \xi \left( R_t^L L_{t-1} + R_t^h e_t L^*_t + R_t^b B_{t-1} \right)
\]

Retiring bankers

Bankers’ start-up funds

Hence, the representative worker chooses consumption, labor supply, and bank deposits to maximize eq. \((17)\) subject to eq. \((1)\). Let \( u_{ct} \) denote the marginal utility of consumption and \( \Lambda_{t,t+1} \) the household’s stochastic discount factor; then, a household’s first order conditions for labor supply and consumption/saving decisions are

\[
\mathbb{E}_t u_{ct} w_t = \zeta_0 H_t^C \left( C_t - \mathcal{H} C_{t-1} - \frac{\zeta_0}{1 + \zeta} H_{t+1}^C \right)^{-\gamma}
\]

\[
1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ R_{t+1} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \right]
\]

\[
D_t^{*,h} = \overline{D}^{*,h} + \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( \frac{R_{t+1}}{e_t} R^{*}_{t+1} - R_{t+1} \right) \right]}{\kappa_{D,S}}
\]

\[
S_t = \overline{S} + \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( R^{knc}_{t+1} - R_{t+1} \right) \right]}{\kappa_S}
\]

with

\[
u_{ct} = \left( C_t - \mathcal{H} C_{t-1} - \frac{\zeta_0}{1 + \zeta} H_{t+1}^C \right)^{-\gamma} - \mathcal{H} \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ C_{t+1} - \mathcal{H} C_t - \frac{\zeta_0}{1 + \zeta} H_{t+1}^C \right]^{-\gamma}
\]

\[
\Lambda_{t,t+1} = \beta \frac{u_{c,t+1}}{u_{ct}}
\]

The optimal demand for private securities and foreign currency-denominated bank deposits (eq. \((21)\) and eq. \((22)\), respectively) is increasing in the excess return of each asset but relative to the parameter that governs the marginal transaction cost. Notice that if the marginal transaction costs disappear (i.e. \( \kappa_D \) and \( \kappa_S \) go to zero), households are able to engage in complete arbitrage and excess returns will tend to be constant. On the contrary, when the marginal transaction costs are infinite, the demands for \( D_t^{*,h} \) and \( S \) are completely unresponsive to excess returns and are given by \( \overline{D}^{*,h} \) and \( \overline{S} \), respectively.

Finally, when household’s demand for bank deposits denominated in foreign currency differs from its frictionless level, endogenous deviations from the UIP condition emerge in equilibrium. Bear in mind, that a similar equation was obtained from banks’ first order conditions whenever their incentive constraint binds. Therefore, when the incentive constraint for banks is binding and households are unable to engage in complete arbitrage, FX interventions are not neutral. However, if household’s demand for bank deposits in foreign currency is infinitely responsive to arbitrage opportunities (i.e. transactions costs become increasingly smaller) the effect of FX interventions is completely neutralized.
2.4 The production sector

There are four types of non-financial firms making up the production side of the model economy: 1) non-commodity final good producers; 2) intermediate good producers; 3) capital good producers; and 4) the commodity production sector, which takes global commodity prices and external demand as given.

**Non-Commodity Final Good Producers.** Final goods in the non-commodity sector are produced under perfect competition and using a variety of differentiated intermediate goods $y_{jt}^{nc}$, with $j \in [0, 1]$, according to the following constant returns to scale technology

$$Y_{t}^{nc} = \left( \int_{0}^{1} y_{jt}^{nc \eta-1} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}$$

(23)

where $\eta > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution across goods. The representative firm chooses $y_{jt}^{nc}$ to maximize profits subject to the production function eq. (23) with profits given by:

$$P_{t}^{nc} Y_{t}^{nc} - \int_{0}^{1} p_{jt}^{nc} y_{jt}^{nc} dj,$$

The first-order conditions for the $j$th input are

$$y_{jt}^{nc} = \left( \frac{p_{jt}^{nc}}{P_{t}^{nc}} \right)^{-\eta} Y_{t}^{nc}$$

$$P_{t}^{nc} = \left( \int_{0}^{1} p_{jt}^{nc(1-\eta)} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$$

The final homogeneous good can be used either for consumption or to produce capital goods. In addition, part of the final good production is exported for foreign consumption.

**Intermediate Good Producers.** There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, indexed by $j \in (0, 1)$, producing differentiated intermediate goods that are sold to final good producers. Each firm manufactures a single variety, face nominal rigidities in the form of price adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) and pay for their capital expenditures in advance of production with funds borrowed from banks. Each intermediate good producer operates the following constant return to scale technology with three inputs: capital $k_{t-1}^{nc}$, imported goods $m_{t}$, and labor $l_{t}$

$$y_{jt}^{nc} = A^{nc} \left( \frac{k_{jt-1}^{nc}}{\alpha_{k}} \right)^{\alpha_{k}} \left( \frac{m_{jt}}{\alpha_{m}} \right)^{\alpha_{m}} \left( \frac{h_{jt}}{1 - \alpha_{k} - \alpha_{m}} \right)^{1-\alpha_{k}-\alpha_{m}}$$

(24)

where $\alpha_{k} > 0$, $\alpha_{m} > 0$, and $\alpha_{k} + \alpha_{m} \in (0, 1)$, and $A^{nc}$ denotes the total factor productivity level of the representative intermediate good producer.

We assume that intermediate good producers issue equity, $S_{jt}$, to domestic households and borrow from banks in order to acquire capital for production. After obtaining funds, each intermediate good producer buys capital from capital good producers at a unitary price $q_{t}^{nc}$. Furthermore, in order to reflect the presence of credit dollarization in some
EMEs and the fact that partially dollarized economies might be more vulnerable to external shocks, we assume that an intermediate good producer needs a combination of domestic and foreign currency-denominated loans to buy capital. The combination of both types of loans is achieved assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology that yields a unit measure of disposable funds, $F_{j,t}$ or loan services. Thus, the loan bundle that an intermediate good producer needs to buy the capital good is the following:

$$F_{j,t} = A^e l_{j,t}^{1-\delta_f} \left( e_t l_{j,t}^* \right)^{\delta_f}$$

(25)

where $A^e$ is the productivity level for aggregate loan services, $l_{j,t}$ and $l_{j,t}^*$ denote domestic and foreign currency-denominated bank loans respectively and the parameter $\delta_f$ controls for the degree of credit dollarization in the economy. Finally, at the end of the period, intermediate good producers sell the undepreciated capital, $\lambda_{nc} k_{j,t-1}^{nc}$, to capital good producers.

First-order conditions for intermediate good producers are presented in three groups, each associated with the following production stages: (i) cost minimization, (ii) borrowing from banks and issuing equity to households, and (iii) price setting. The cost minimization stage yields the standard conditional demands for each input:

$$z_t = a_k mc_t \frac{y_{nc}^{nc}}{k_{j,t-1}^{nc}}$$

(26)

$$e_t = a_m mc_t \frac{y_{nc}^{nc}}{m_{j,t}}$$

(27)

$$mc_t = \frac{1}{\lambda_{nc}} z_t a_t e_t^m w_t^{1-a_k-a_m}$$

(28)

The borrowing stage is characterized by a non-arbitrage condition that defines the return on capital (see eq. (29) below) and real loan demands in domestic and foreign currency (eq. (30) and eq. (31)):

$$R_t^k = z_t + \lambda_{nc} q_{t-1}^{nc}$$

(29)

$$l_{j,t} = \left( 1 - \delta_f \right) \left( \frac{E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^k}{E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^l} \right) F_{j,t}$$

(30)

$$e_t l_{j,t}^* = \delta_f \left( \frac{E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^l}{E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} e_t l_{t,1+1}^* R_{t+1}^l} \right) F_{j,t}$$

(31)

$$q_t^{nc} k_{j,t-1}^{nc} = S_{j,t} + F_{j,t}$$

(32)

In equilibrium, issuing equity and borrowing from banks are considered to be perfect substitutes to intermediate good producers, since both, generate equal expected real costs. The demand schedules for domestic and foreign currency loans depend directly on the expected return on capital as well as on the current value of acquired capital by each firm and inversely on the expected interest rate cost of each type of credit. Therefore,

\[\text{See appendix C.3 for a detail derivation of the following equations.}\]
in equilibrium the degree of credit dollarization, given by\( \frac{eL_t^c}{L_{t+e}^c} \) where \( e \) is the steady-state real exchange rate, is an endogenous variable that depends on domestic financial conditions. The parameter \( \delta^f \) determines if intermediate good producers need to borrow in foreign currency from banks. Whenever \( \delta^f = 0 \), the demand for foreign currency loans is zero and banks’ balance sheet is such that there is no asset dollarization (see Section 5).

Finally, the price setting stage is characterized by the following New Keynesian Phillips curve:

\[
(1 + \pi_t)\pi_t = \frac{1}{\kappa}(1 - \eta + \eta mc_t) + \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1}(1 + \pi_{t+1})\pi_{t+1} \frac{Y_{t+1}^nc}{Y_t^nc} \right]
\] (33)

**Capital Good Producers.** There is a continuum of capital producers operating in a competitive market. Each capital good producer uses final goods as inputs in the form of non-commodity investments, as well as the undepreciated capital bought from intermediate good producers. New capital is produced using the following technology:

\[
K_t^{nc} = I_t^{nc} + \lambda_{nc} K_{t-1}^{nc}
\] (34)

where \( K_t^{nc} \) is sold to intermediate good producers at the price \( q_t^{nc} \). Producing capital implies an additional cost of \( \Phi^{nc} \left( \frac{I_t^{nc}}{I_{t-1}^{nc}} \right) I_t^{nc} \), which represents the adjustment cost of investment. The latter assumption is introduced to replicate some empirical moments 14. Given that households own the capital good firm, the objective of a capital producer is to choose \( I_{t+j}^{nc} \) \( j \geq 0 \) to solve:

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+j} \left( q_{t+j}^{nc} I_{t+j}^{nc} - \left[ 1 + \Phi^{nc} \left( \frac{I_{t+j}^{nc}}{I_{t+j}^{nc}} \right) \right] I_{t+j}^{nc} \right) \right]
\]

Profit maximization implies that the price of capital goods is equal to the marginal cost of investment good production as follows:

\[
q_t^{nc} = 1 + \Phi^{nc} \left( \frac{I_t^{nc}}{I_{t-1}^{nc}} + \frac{I_t^{nc}}{I_{t+1}^{nc}} \right) \partial \Phi_t^{nc}
\] (35)

where \( \partial \Phi_t^{nc} \) denotes the derivative of \( \Phi^{nc}(.) \) evaluated at \( \frac{I_t^{nc}}{I_{t-1}^{nc}} \).

**Commodity Sector.** Commodity price movements play a major role in commodity-exporting EMEs. Conventional wisdom suggests that terms-of-trade fluctuations constitute an important driver of business cycle fluctuations in EMEs. In particular, commodity booms generate real as well as credit booms.15

We introduce a commodity sector with a representative firm that produces a homogeneous commodity good taking global commodity prices and external demand as given. We assume this firm is owned by both foreign and domestic agents. Commodity production is entirely exported abroad and is conducted using capital specific to this sector as the

---

14The function \( \Phi^{nc}(.) \) must satisfy the following restrictions: \( \Phi^{nc}(1) = (\Phi^{nc})'(1) = 0 \) and \( (\Phi^{nc})''(.) > 0 \).

15For empirical evidence on this fact, see Fornero et al. (2015), Shousha (2016), Fernández et al. (2017), Garcia-Cicco et al. (2017), and Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018).
only input. Capital is acquired directly from final good producers and is used to produce commodity-sector capital without any lending from the banking system. Technology in this sector is

\[ Y_t^c = A_c^c (K_{t-1}^c)^{a_c} \]  

where \( Y_t^c \) is the commodity production, \( K_t^c \) is the specific capital for the commodity sector, and \( A^c \) is the productivity level in this sector. We assume that the commodity firm's ownership is divided between domestic and foreign shareholders. Specifically, domestic households own a fraction \( \chi^c \) of the total firm's value while foreign families own \( (1 - \chi^c) \). Moreover, we assume that commodity firm's should pay a fraction \( \tau^c \) of its profits as domestic government taxes.

The representative commodity producer faces investment adjustment costs of \( \Phi^c \left( \frac{I_t^c}{I_t^c} \right) \). Thus, capital accumulation is done through the following equation:

\[ K_t^c = I_t^c + \lambda_c K_{t-1}^c \]  

The representative producer problem in the commodity sector is to choose \( \{K_{t+s}^c\}_{s \geq 0} \) and \( \{I_{t+s}^c\}_{s \geq 0} \) to maximize\(^{16}\)

\[ \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+s} (1 - \tau^c) \left( p_{t+s}^c A^c (K_{t+s-1}^c)^{a_c} - \left[ 1 + \Phi^c \left( \frac{I_{t+s}^c}{I_t^c} \right) \right] I_{t+s}^c \right) \]

subject to eq. (36). The first-order conditions for the above problem are

\[ q_t^c = 1 + \Phi^c \left( \frac{I_t^c}{I_t^c} \right) + \left( \frac{I_t^c}{I_t^c} \right) \partial \Phi^c \]

\[ 1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^{kc} \right] \]

\[ R_{t+1}^{kc} = \frac{\alpha_c p_t^c \frac{I_t^c}{K_{t-1}^c} + q_t^c \lambda^c}{q_{t-1}^c} \]

where \( \partial \Phi^c \) denotes the derivative of \( \Phi^c(\cdot) \) evaluated at \( \frac{I_t^c}{I_t^c} \) and \( (1 - \tau^c)q_t^c \) is the shadow price for the commodity-specific stock of capital. We assume that the domestic household owns a higher fraction of the representative commodity producer. Therefore, the stochastic discount factor used by the commodity producer is also the one used by domestic households.

Finally, we assume that a fraction \( (1 - \chi^c) \) of the profits is transferred abroad to foreign owners. The aggregate profit in the commodity sector is given by

\[ \Pi_t^c = p_t^c A^c (K_{t-1}^c)^{a_c} - \left[ 1 + \Phi^c \left( \frac{I_t^c}{I_t^c} \right) \right] I_t^c \]

It is worth mentioning that in our framework a commodity boom directly raises the demand for domestic final goods, since non-commodity investment is used as input to

\(^{16}\)We assume that foreign stochastic discount factor is the same of the their domestic counterpart. Hence, we use \( \Lambda_{t,t+1} \) as the discount factor for future commodity sector's cash-flows independent of its ownership.
produce specific capital for the commodity sector. The latter occurs independently of the standard wealth effect that surges in commodity prices generate when this sector is modeled as an exogenous endowment. Furthermore, the demand for credit also increases as a response to both, the wealth effect and the increase in the production of intermediate goods needed to support the higher demand for final goods.

2.5 External Sector

We assume that foreign demand for non-commodity final goods is a decreasing function of the relative price \( \frac{1}{e_t} \) but increasing with the foreign income \( Y_t^* \) as

\[
Y_t^{nc,x} = e_t^\phi Y_t^*
\]

(42)

where \( \phi > 0 \) is the price elasticity.

The foreign sector block has its own dynamic outside the domestic macroeconomic equilibrium and does not have feedback from domestic variables. We consider as external variables foreign output \( Y_t^* \), foreign interest rate \( R_t^* \), and the commodity price index \( p_t^{wc} \); and collect these variables in vector \( \hat{X}_t \), which captures the cyclical movements of these variables in an SVAR block; i.e.,

\[
\hat{X}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \hat{Y}_t^* \\ \hat{R}_t^* \\ \hat{p}_t^* \end{bmatrix}
\]

where \( \hat{Y}_t^* = \ln \frac{Y_t^*}{Y_t} \), \( \hat{R}_t^* = R_t^* - R^* \), and \( \hat{p}_t^* = \ln \frac{p_t^{wc}}{p_t^{wc}} \). Then, we assume that \( \hat{X}_t \) follows a vector autoregressive equation written as

\[
\hat{X}_t = C\hat{X}_{t-1} + B u_t^X
\]

(43)

where \( C \) and \( B \) are \( 3 \times 3 \) matrices that rule the dynamics of the vector \( \hat{X}_t \), and \( u_t^X \) is the vector of external structural shocks from which we analyze its consequences. Section 3 presents further details in the way we estimate eq. (43) and identify its structural shocks.

2.6 Central Government

The consolidated government collects taxes from households and receives a fraction \( \chi^e \) of commodity firms’ profits. These resources are then used to finance public consumption \( G_t \) and central bank operational losses \( CB_t \):

\[
\chi^e \Pi_t^e + T_t = CB_t + G_t
\]

(44)

It is worthy noticing that eq. (44) indicates that either commodity price cycles or central bank operational losses will strongly affect household’s decisions through variations in lump-sum taxes.
We also assume that the monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate $i_t$ according to a simple feedback rule following a standard Taylor-type rule:

$$i_t - i = \rho_i(i_{t-1} - i) + (1 - \rho_i) \left[ \omega_\pi \pi_t + \omega_y \ln \left( \frac{\text{GDP}_t}{\text{GDP}} \right) \right]$$ (45)

where $\rho_i$ measures the persistence of the policy rate and $\omega_\pi$ controls the degree of the policy rate response to inflation variations. In order to converge to a stable equilibrium, this rule should satisfy the Taylor principle; i.e., $\omega_\pi > 1$.

### 2.7 Market Equilibrium

The non-commodity output is either consumed, invested, exported, or used to pay the cost of adjusting prices, the cost of changing investment decisions, and the resources wasted after aggregating funds at the intermediate good producer level,

$$Y_t^{nc} = C_t + G_t + I_t^{nc} + I_t^c + Y_t^{x,nc} + \text{REST}_t$$ (46)

where

$$\text{REST}_t = \frac{K}{2} \pi_t^2 Y_t^{nc} + e_t \frac{K_D}{2} \left( D_t^{s,h} - D_t^{h,s} \right)^2 + \frac{K_S}{2} \left( S_t - \bar{S} \right)^2 + \Phi^c \left( \frac{I_t^c}{I_t^c} \right) + \Phi^e \left( \frac{I_t^e}{I_t^e} \right) + L_t + e_t L_t^s - \mathcal{T}_t$$

We should impose a market clearing condition also for the foreign currency deposits:

$$D_t^s = D_t^{s,h} + D_t^{s,f}$$ (47)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the aggregate value added of the non-commodity and commodity sectors, all priced at constant prices:

$$\text{GDP}_t = Y_t^{nc} - e M_t + p_c Y_t^c$$ (48)

where $p_c$ and $e$ are the steady-state levels for the commodity price index and the real exchange rate, respectively. Therefore, GDP$_t$ captures only real output movements and is not affected by valuation effects.

The aggregate net foreign asset position NFAP$_t$, which is equal to FX official reserves minus aggregate foreign liabilities in the banking system (i.e. $F_t - D_t^{s,f}$), evolves through the trade balance net of the fraction of commodity firms’ profits transferred abroad and the financial income of net foreign assets from the previous period,

$$e_t \left[ \text{NFAP}_t - R_t^c \text{NFAP}_{t-1} \right] = Y_t^{x,nc} + p_t^c Y_t^c - e_t M_t - (1 - \tau_c)(1 - \chi_t) \Pi_t^c$$ (49)

Finally, since optimal banks’ decisions do not depend on bank-specific factors, the aggregation for the banking system variables is straightforward. In appendix C.1, we show that the total net worth evolves according to:

$$N_t = (\sigma + \xi) \left( R_t^b L_{t-1} + R_t^i e_t L_{t-1}^s + R_t^b B_{t-1} \right) - \sigma R_t D_{t-1} - \sigma e_t R_t^b D_{t-1}^s$$ (50)
3 Parametrization Strategy

We discipline the model to replicate some relevant unconditional and conditional moments for the Peruvian economy. We calibrate a subset of the parameters to be consistent with some steady state targets associated with historical averages. Additionally, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2018) to estimate another subset of parameters by using a limited information method based on an impulse response matching function estimator. For this purpose, we estimate an SVAR with two recursive blocks. Then, we estimate some parameters of our macroeconomic model by minimizing the distance between the structural impulse responses implied by the macroeconomic model and the corresponding empirical impulse responses implied by the SVAR model. Let Ξ be the subset of parameters to be estimated by matching the impulse responses to external shocks, $M^\text{data}$ the corresponding empirical impulse responses from the SVAR model, and $M^\text{model}$ the theoretical counterpart of $M^\text{data}$. Then we set Ξ to be the solution to the following problem

$$\Xi^* = \arg \min_{\Xi} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{1}{\phi_i} \times \left[ M^\text{model}_i(\Xi) - M^\text{data}_i \right]^2$$

where $\phi_i$ denotes the width of the 68% confidence interval associated with the $i$th variable in $M^\text{data}$.

Empirical VAR Specification. We consider an SVAR model with two blocks similar to Canova (2005), Cushman and Zha (1997), and Zha (1999). Let $X_t$ denote the vector of foreign variables and $D_t$ the vector of domestic variables. In the baseline specification, each block is composed by the following variables:

$$X_t = \begin{bmatrix} Y_t^* \\ R_t^* \\ p_t^{wmc} \end{bmatrix}, \quad D_t = \begin{bmatrix} t b_t \\ GDP_t \\ C_t \\ I_t \\ L_t \\ e L_t^* \\ e_t \end{bmatrix}$$

The external variables $Y_t^*$, $R_t^*$, and $p_t^{wmc}$ denote the real GDP index for the G-20 group of countries, the Baa U.S corporate spread, and a metal export price index relevant for Peru. The domestic variables $GDP_t$, $C_t$, $I_t$, $L_t$, and $e_t L_t^*$ denote real indexes for Peru’s GDP, consumption, investment, and real bank lending in domestic currency as well as in foreign currency respectively, while $e_t$ denotes the bilateral real exchange rate and $t b_t$ the trade balance-to-GDP ratio. Following Canova (2005), the baseline specification considers $X_t$ as an exogenous block, with no feedback dynamics from the domestic block, $D_t$, at any point in time. Therefore, like much of the related literature, the main identification assumption is that an emerging small open economy as Peru, takes as given world prices and quantities. The baseline specification assumes that all variables are expressed in log-levels. The only variables expressed in percentage terms are $R_t^*$ and $t b_t$. Therefore, we consider an SVAR in levels with zero restrictions between blocks and a linear or quadratic time trend in order to capture the SOE assumption of the Peruvian economy, as well as to control for time trends. It is important to mention that shocks within each block are identified recursively with zero contemporaneous restrictions.
Formally, consider the following restricted block VAR model with deterministic trend:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
X_t \\
D_t
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\Phi_X & \Theta_X \\
\Phi_D & \Theta_D
\end{bmatrix} G(t) + \begin{bmatrix}
\Phi_{1XX}^X (L) & 0 \\
\Phi_{1DX}^X (L) & \Theta_{1DD} (L)
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
X_{t-1} \\
D_{t-1}
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
v^X_t \\
v^D_t
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where \(G(t)\) measures a deterministic time trend\(^{17}\). \(\Phi_X, \Phi_D\) are vectors of ones, \(v^X_t \sim N(0, \Sigma_v^X)\) and \(v^D_t \sim N(0, \Sigma_v^D)\). Hence, the underlying SVAR model is

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\Theta^0_{XX} & 0 \\
\Theta^0_{DX} & \Theta^0_{DD}
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
X_t \\
D_t
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\Theta_X \\
\Theta_D
\end{bmatrix} G(t) + \begin{bmatrix}
\Theta_{1XX}^X (L) & 0 \\
\Theta_{1DX}^X (L) & \Theta_{1DD} (L)
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
X_{t-1} \\
D_{t-1}
\end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix}
u^X_t \\
u^D_t
\end{bmatrix}
\]

We use quarterly data, covering from 2002Q1 to 2017Q2 for the domestic block and from 1980Q1 to 2017Q2 for the foreign block. Following Fernández et al. (2017), we first estimate the foreign block separately and impose the corresponding estimated parameters in the estimation of the domestic block.

**Table 2. Raw Parametrization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution</td>
<td>(\gamma)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverse Frisch Elasticity</td>
<td>(\zeta)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of Substitution of Goods</td>
<td>(\eta)</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undepreciated NC Capital Rate</td>
<td>(\lambda^{nc})</td>
<td>0.975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undepreciated C Capital Rate</td>
<td>(\lambda^c)</td>
<td>0.975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Ownership on Commodity Firms</td>
<td>(\chi^c)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax on Commodity Sector Profit</td>
<td>(\tau^c)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banker’s Start-Up Transfers</td>
<td>(\xi)</td>
<td>1.00e-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Rate Smoothing</td>
<td>(\rho_i)</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Rate response to Inflation</td>
<td>(\omega_n)</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Rate response to Output Gap</td>
<td>(\omega_y)</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Calibration based on previous literature.** The elasticity of intertemporal substitution for household preferences is equal to 1/2 (i.e., \(\gamma = 2\)). Consistent with Céspedes and Rendón (2012), households preferences have a Frisch elasticity of the labor supply equal to 1/3 (i.e., \(\zeta = 3\)). With respecto to, the production sector, the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods is set at 6 and the capital depreciation rate is set at 10% annually for both sectors. We also assume that foreign agents have the ownership of commodity firms (i.e., \(\chi^c = 0\)) but there is a commodity profit tax of 60% which is in line with García-Cicco et al. (2017). Moreover, the parameters controlling the conventional monetary policy response (\(\rho_i; \omega_n, \omega_y\)) are parametrized using previous work (see Castillo et al. (2009) and Winkelried (2013)). Finally, and based on ABK’s steady-state analysis, we fix the fraction of total assets transferred to start-up bankers, \(\xi\), in a tiny and positive level, \(1e^{-10}\). Table 2 summarizes this raw parametrization.

**Steady-State Targets.** Regarding the banking side of the model, we parametrize \((\omega^*, \omega^b, \xi, \theta, x, \delta^f)\) to be consistent with the following steady-state financial targets for Peru:

\(^{17}\)Like the SVAR model, the DSGE model considers deterministic time trends that are removed before the matching procedure.
annual domestic currency lending rate of 6%, an annual foreign currency lending rate of 4%, an annual return of 4% for central bank bonds, a domestic currency leverage of 3.50, dollar deposits to total assets ratio of 53.5%, and a credit dollarization rate of 42.5%.

For the non-banking sector, the vector of parameters \((A^e, \zeta_0, Y^*, p^{wc}, A^{nc})\) is calibrated to attain 8% of annual non-commodity capital return, 0.33 of worked hours and steady-state levels for the real exchange rate, the commodity price index, and GDP set at 1. Furthermore, the vector \((\overline{D}^h, \overline{S}, \alpha^c, A^c, \alpha^k, \alpha^m, B^{fx})\) is parametrized to target some empirical ratios, such as consumption to GDP, commodity to non-commodity investment or FX reserves to GDP, among others. Table 10 in Appendix A summarizes our parametrization strategy based on steady-state targets, described above.

**Impulse Response Matching.** The rest of the parameter set is estimated to match impulses responses to external shocks between the SVAR model and the DSGE model. We use the responses of GDP, consumption, investment, domestic currency denominated loans (DC loans), and the real exchange rate for the first 24 quarters in order to perform the matching estimation.

Our estimation results are summarized in Table 3. Figure 3 compares the corresponding impulse-responses. Our empirical model indicates that a foreign interest rate shock causes a real exchange rate depreciation and a contraction on aggregate credit and output. On the other hand, the global demand and the commodity price shocks are expansionary in terms of domestic output, investment, and total credit. These empirical responses are very closely followed by the theoretical responses of our DSGE model.

### Table 3. IRF Matching Parametrization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Commodity Capital Adjustment Cost</td>
<td>(k_{1nc})</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Capital Adjustment Cost</td>
<td>(k_{1c})</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FX Intervention response to RER</td>
<td>(\psi)</td>
<td>9.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Commodity Exports Price Elasticity</td>
<td>(\varphi)</td>
<td>1.49e-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household FC Deposit Adjustment Cost</td>
<td>(k_{D^s})</td>
<td>17.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Capital Adjustment Cost</td>
<td>(k_{S})</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Habit Formation</td>
<td>(H)</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarkably, Figure 3 indicates that, in response to a commodity price shock, the empirical impulse responses from the SVAR model are consistent with hump-shaped dynamics for the real exchange rate. In our model, FX interventions modify the response of exchange rate expectations as well as the relative costs and returns of borrowing and lending in foreign and domestic currency when compared to the flexible exchange rate regime. These modifications play a key role to generate hump-shaped movements for the real exchange rate in our model. In Figure 4, we compare the real exchange rate response to a commodity price shock under both exchange rate regimes. The foreign block in our model is calibrated as in the estimated SVAR. Therefore, the commodity price shock generates a positive co-movement between the external variables in the SVAR as well as in the structural model. The baseline parametrization of our model indicates that under exchange rate flexibility, a commodity boom generates a real exchange rate appreciation.
that only occurs at impact, undershooting its long-run equilibrium level. After impact, the exchange rate is below its steady state and depreciates in every period since. Hence, under exchange rate flexibility agents expect an exchange rate depreciation. On the contrary, after a commodity boom, the FX intervention policy generates consecutive exchange rate appreciations for about 6 quarters implying that the same shock induce different expectation dynamics between both exchange rate regimes.
**Figure 4. Commodity Price Shock, FX Intervention, and Real Exchange Rate**

![Graphs showing the response of various economic indicators to FX intervention and flexible exchange rate regimes.](image)

**Note.** The solid black line plots the response of the baseline under a sterilized foreign exchange regime while the blue dash-line plots the aggregate variables response of the model under a flexible exchange rate regime.

### 4 Numerical Experiments

In this section, we perform several simulations designed to analyze how FX intervention operations affect the response of the model economy to external shocks. Specifically, we focus on the transmission of a sudden increase in the foreign interest rate and a global commodity boom. The foreign block in our baseline model is calibrated as in the estimated SVAR. However, we mute the estimated correlation structure among foreign variables to isolate the effect of each shock as the sole external mechanism at play.

We begin by analyzing the responses of aggregate variables to external shocks under two different exchange rate regimes: exchange rate flexibility vs. an FX intervention policy regime. Under the FX intervention regime, the central bank "leans against the wind" with respect to real exchange rate fluctuations by implementing eq. (16), but its interest rate rule is also active. Next, we simulate an exogenous, sufficiently large and permanent unanticipated accumulation (purchase) of FX reserves and study the transmission mechanisms for this shock. Finally, we conduct a policy evaluation exercise by computing the welfare gains/costs of different policy regimes relative to our baseline regime.

Recent empirical literature about FX policy (see Fratzscher et al. (2019)) uses distinct criteria to measure the effectiveness of the FX intervention policy. In this line, our numerical experiments can be seen as designed to evaluate these criteria. For instance, our

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18In Appendix B.3, we also show the responses to an increase in global GDP.
impulse-response analysis can be associated to the event criterion which tests whether the exchange rate moves in the intended direction during the intervention episode (e.g., if the central bank buys foreign currency, the real exchange rate should depreciates). At the same time, in line with the exchange rate dynamics smoothing criterion, we evaluate whether FX interventions limit the real exchange rate volatility (see Tab. 4). Although this literature has studied the effectiveness of FX intervention in terms of the exchange rate volatility, we extend its usage to analyse the FX policy effectiveness over a broader set of macroeconomic variables. Additionally, we use the general equilibrium framework of our model economy to explore the effectiveness of the FX intervention policy in terms of welfare relative to exchange rate flexibility.

Our results suggest that when financial constraints are binding (i.e., limits to arbitrage emerge for banks and households leading to endogenous deviations from UIP conditions), FX intervention operations play the role of an external shock absorber: conditional on external shocks, macroeconomic volatility is significantly reduced under the FX intervention policy relative to the flexible exchange rate regime. In particular, the volatility of the real exchange rate (RER) is reduced by 68%, while the corresponding volatility of total credit declines by 82% (see Table 4). Simultaneously, the volatility of output, investment, and consumption falls by around 70, 65, and 7 percent, respectively. Therefore, according to the volatility smoothing criterion, FX interventions are significantly effective to stabilize domestic macroeconomic volatility conditional to external shocks.\textsuperscript{19}

**Table 4. Aggregate Volatility Conditional on External Shocks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FXI</th>
<th>FER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RER</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIP Spread</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>11.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Credit</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>6.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency Mismatch</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Standard deviations for major aggregate variables. FXI and FER denote Foreign Exchange Intervention and Flexible Exchange Rate policy regime respectively. The computation consider the external block as the only source of aggregate volatility and it is based on 2500 replications of 120 periods simulated trajectories.

In the following numerical experiments, we discuss the mechanisms through which FX intervention policy stabilize domestic macroeconomic variables responses in the presence of external shocks. In the remain of the document we will constantly make reference to two financial dollarization measures: credit dollarization, \( eL_t^* / (L_t + eL_t^*) \), defined as foreign currency loans as a fraction of total lending, and deposit dollarization, \( eD_t^* / (D_t + eD_t^*) \), defined as the bank’s foreign currency borrowing as a fraction of total

\textsuperscript{19}Even though the FX intervention rule eq. (16) implies a linear response to any deviation of the real exchange rate from its steady-state, the reduced macroeconomic volatility result is not necessary and obvious. Below, we explore cases where the FX intervention regime modelled as in eq. (16) does not necessarily succeed in terms of the volatility smoothing criterion.
bank’s liabilities, both evaluated at the steady-state real exchange rate level.

### 4.1 Responses to External Shocks

#### 4.1.1 Foreign Interest Rate Shock

Figure 5 and Figure 6 show responses to an unexpected increase of 20 basis points in the foreign interest rate of financial and macroeconomic variables respectively. The dotted line reports responses under flexible exchange rate (i.e., $v_e = 0$, in eq. (16)) while the solid line represents the economy under the FX intervention policy. We first describe the transmission mechanism under exchange rate flexibility.

Initially, the real exchange rate (RER in Fig. 5) depreciates by 2.1% and the economy experiences a contractionary financial effect. Since banks are exposed to currency mismatches in their balance sheets, the real exchange depreciation negatively affects banks’ net worth and total credit; and ultimately generates a recession. Net worth declines at impact, but shows a fast recovery and then stabilizes around zero. Although the real exchange rate depreciates immediately after the shock, agents expect an exchange rate appreciation (see the dynamics of RER and real depreciation, $\Delta e$, in Fig. 5). The expected exchange rate appreciation modifies the relative costs and returns of borrowing and lending in foreign currency with respect to domestic currency, thereby changing the composition of banks’ balance sheets. Thus, banks realize that borrowing in foreign currency is cheaper than in domestic deposits, and that lending in foreign currency becomes less profitable than lending in domestic currency. Consequently, banks reduce borrowing in both currencies but with a higher deposit dollarization (an impact of around 2 percentage points right after the shock occurs) and reduce lending in foreign currency implying a lower credit dollarization (an impact of -0.4 percentage points right after the shock).

Hence, under a flexible exchange rate regime, the exchange rate depreciation induced by a higher foreign interest rate, boosts the size of the currency mismatch, thereby reducing the intermediation capacity of banks, so that lending in both currencies declines by around 2.8%.

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20From the point of view of intermediate good producers, a foreign interest rate shock produces a substitution and an income effect with respect to their demand of each type of loans. The parametrization of the model, more precisely the IRF matching, is such that the income effect is much stronger than the substitution effect. Therefore, even though, the expected spread $E_t \left[ \frac{\varepsilon_t \varepsilon_t}{\varepsilon_t} R_{t+1}^f - R_{t+1}^d \right]$ declines as a response to an increase in the foreign interest rate, intermediate good producers reduce borrowing in both currencies due to the contraction in aggregate lending and investment.
**Figure 5. Responses of Financial Variables to a Foreign Interest Rate Shock**

![Graphs showing responses of financial variables to a foreign interest rate shock.]

**Note.** The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state. $e_t$, $\Delta e$, and $\Delta s$ denote the real exchange rate, real depreciation, and nominal depreciation, respectively. $\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{c_{t+1}}{e_t} R^{l*}_{t+1} - R^l_{t+1} \right]$ and $\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{c_{t+1}}{e_t} R^{s*}_{t+1} - R_{t+1} \right]$ measure the relative return of lending in foreign currency as well as the relative cost of borrowing in foreign currency from the point of view of banks.

Financial conditions are reflected on interest rate spreads and macroeconomic variables. In particular, right after the foreign interest rate increases, the reduction of the bank’s lending capacity is mirrored in a higher expected interest rate spread of domestic currency lending relative to domestic currency borrowing (in 0.8 annual p.p.) as well as in the expected excess return of non-commodity capital over domestic deposits (in 0.4 annual p.p.). Therefore, investment falls by 3%, leading to a prolonged recession, with GDP falling by 0.7% (see Fig. 6). Finally, exchange rate depreciation raises inflation by 0.2% on impact, since the marginal cost of intermediate good producers depends on an imported input. The increase in inflation leads to a higher interest rate due to the standard Taylor rule mechanism.
**Figure 6. Responses of Macroeconomic Variables to a Foreign Interest Rate Shock**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
<th>Policy Rate</th>
<th>$E[R]$</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Trade Balance/GDP</th>
<th>Current Account (% GDP)</th>
<th>Foreign Output</th>
<th>Foreign Interest Rate</th>
<th>Commodity Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image3.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image4.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image5.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image6.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image7.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image8.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image9.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image10.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image11.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image12.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state.

When the central bank responds to a foreign interest rate shock implementing FX intervention policy, together with its standard monetary policy rule, both financial and macroeconomic variables are stabilized relative to the flexible exchange rate regime. The effect of FX interventions on the transmission mechanism of an external shock operates through two main channels: the exchange rate smoothing channel and the balance sheet substitution channel.

**Exchange Rate Smoothing Channel.** When the incentive constraint binds, FX interventions modify the net asset foreign position of the aggregate economy, as well as the interest rate spread between foreign borrowing and domestic deposits that firms, households and banks face. In particular, the central bank responds to an increase in the foreign interest rate by selling official FX reserves. Therefore, exchange rate dynamics change relative to the flexible exchange rate regime. At impact, the real exchange rate depreciates by 1% under the FX intervention regime, instead of 2.6% under the flexible exchange rate regime. After the impact, FX interventions successfully stabilize future real exchange rate appreciations.

As a result, banks’ net worth declines less at impact under the FX intervention regime (around 1% instead of 2.5% under the flexible exchange rate regime, see Fig. 5). The smoother pattern for the real exchange rate modifies the cost of borrowing in foreign currency relative to domestic currency deposits. In particular, under the FX intervention regime, the expected interest rate spread of domestic-currency borrowing over domestic-currency deposits raises around 0.1 percentage points instead of falling in 0.4 percentage...
points under free-floating exchange rate. Hence, contrary to the free-floating regime, deposit dollarization declines by one percentage point at impact. Similarly, the expected interest rate spread of foreign-currency loans over domestic currency loans is more stable, implying that credit dollarization falls but not as much as under exchange rate flexibility.

**Balance Sheet Substitution Channel.** This channel is associated with central bank sterilization operations to keep domestic liquidity constant after FX sales. The central bank buys bonds that are in banks’ balance sheets, ultimately affecting their size and composition. Consequently, this operation releases bank funds, which are used to lend in both currencies. In this regard, FX interventions are similar to credit policies in the non-conventional monetary policy literature for closed economies.

Quantitatively, our results suggest that the sterilization leg of FX sales implies that central bank bonds in banks’ balance sheets decline by 10% at impact (see the response of CB Bonds in Fig. 5). As a result, lending denominated in both currencies decline less than under exchange rate flexibility. In particular, at the trough of the recession, total loans fall by 0.7% when FX interventions are used, instead of declining by 2.8% under free floating.

### 4.1.2 Commodity Price Shock

EMEs face volatile commodity prices that shape capital flows and domestic financial conditions. In this section, we simulate a persistent increase in commodity prices and compare the transmission mechanism of this shock under exchange rate flexibility and the FX intervention policy. Figure 7 shows the responses of financial variables, while Figure 8 presents the response of key macroeconomic variables. The dotted line corresponds to the flexible exchange rate regime.

Under exchange rate flexibility, a persistent increase in commodity prices raises exports and a large fraction of the revenues from commodity exports remains in the economy, leading to a persistent exchange rate appreciation of around 6% at impact (see $\Delta e$ in Fig. 7). The commodity sector experiences a prolonged economic boom that spreads to the rest of the economy through a significant wealth effect and a higher demand of investment goods.

The exchange rate appreciation relaxes the agency constraint that banks face via a 9% (see Fig. 7) increase in net worth, together with a significant currency mismatch reduction of 5.1 percentage point right after the shock occurs. The latter is an expansionary financial effect induced by the real exchange rate appreciation. Hence, lending in both currencies rises by around 5.7% at impact. Under exchange rate flexibility, agents expect a real exchange rate depreciation, implying that banks realize that borrowing in foreign currency is more expensive than in domestic currency, while lending in foreign currency is more profitable than in domestic currency. The change in the composition of banks’ balance sheets is consistent with a 1.3 p.p. increase in credit dollarization and a reduction of four percentage points in deposit dollarization at impact.

The commodity boom, together with the consequent expansionary financial conditions (i.e., credit boom), modify the dynamics of interest rate spreads and real macroeconomic variables. Specifically, the expected interest rate spread of domestic-currency lending
**Figure 7. Responses of Financial Variables to a Commodity Price Shock**

Note. The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state. $e_t$, $\Delta e$, and $\Delta s$ denotes the real exchange rate, real depreciation, and nominal depreciation, respectively. $\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{c_i}{e_t} R_{t+1}^{*s} - R_{t+1}^l \right]$ and $\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{c_i}{e_t} R_{t+1}^{*s} - R_{t+1}^s \right]$ measure the relative return of lending in foreign currency as well as the relative cost of borrowing in foreign currency from the point of view of banks.

Relative to domestic-currency deposits falls around 0.4 percentage points (see Fig. 7), while the expected interest rate spread of foreign borrowing with respect to domestic-currency deposits raises by 1 percentage points. Investment and consumption increase persistently by around 9.3% and 0.9% at the peak of their responses, respectively (see Fig. 8). The commodity boom under a flexible exchange rate regime induces a period of persistent economic expansion, with GDP increasing in 1.8% at impact.

When FX intervention policy is used, the central bank accumulates FX reserves and allocates central bank riskless bonds to the banking system as a response to higher commodity prices and the appreciative pressures on the real exchange rate. Given the binding agency problem, accumulating FX reserves significantly reduces exchange rate appreciation, thereby limiting the expansion of bank credit and the consequent expansion in macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption, investment, and GDP. As mentioned before, FX interventions operate through the exchange rate smoothing channel and the balance sheet substitution channel.

**Exchange Rate Smoothing Channel.** The central bank responds to a commodity price shock by buying FX reserves, thereby modifying the net foreign asset position of the economy. As a result, exchange rate dynamics change relative to the flexible exchange rate regime. At impact, the real exchange rate appreciates by 1.6% instead of 6% (see Fig. 7). Consequently, at impact banks’ net worth increases less than under free floating.
Note. The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state.

(2% instead of 9%). Moreover, the smoother pattern of real exchange rate modifies the costs and returns of foreign-currency borrowing and lending. When the central bank implements FX intervention, banks increase foreign borrowing together with domestic deposits, implying higher deposit dollarization relative to the flexible exchange rate regime (see the response of $E_t [\frac{\ell_{t+1} R^s_{t+1}}{\ell_t} - R^d_{t+1}]$ and $E_t [\frac{\ell_{t+1} R^s_{t+1}}{\ell_t} - R^d_{t+1}]$ in Fig. 7). Likewise, the expected real exchange rate appreciation under FX intervention signals banks that foreign-currency lending is more profitable than lending in domestic currency. Credit dollarization increases, but less than under exchange rate flexibility.

**Balance Sheet Substitution Channel.** When the central bank responds to a commodity price shock by building FX reserves, a sterilization operation is implemented simultaneously; i.e., central bank bonds are sold to maintain the domestic liquidity constant (see CB Bonds in Fig. 7). As a result, the composition and size of banks’ balance sheets change, ultimately generating a crowding-out effect that limits lending resources. In particular, banks allocate their increased available funds to central bank bonds instead of lending. Banks increase their holdings of central bank bonds by 16% at the moment of the commodity shock. Accordingly, lending in both currencies increase by less than under exchange rate flexibility. The muted response of aggregate credit under the FX intervention regime is reflected in the response of interest rate spreads. Figure 7 shows that the interest rate spread of domestic-currency lending over domestic currency deposits raises around 0.1 p.p. when the central bank responds by building FX reserves instead of falling 0.5 p.p. under exchange rate flexibility.
4.2 The transmission of a permanent buildup of FX reserves

In this section, we analyze the impact of an exogenous FX intervention shock to obtain more insights about the transmission mechanism. We assume the FX intervention rule is given by the following exogenous autoregressive process:

\[ \ln B_t = \rho_B (\ln B_{t-1} - \ln B) + u_t^B, \quad \text{with } \rho_B \approx 1 \]  

where \( u_t^B \) is interpreted as an unanticipated central bank purchase of FX reserves. Under the above process, an exogenous buildup of FX reserves has permanent effects over central bank bonds in hands of the banking system. Figure 9 shows responses to a sufficiently persistent unanticipated purchase of FX reserves together with the corresponding sterilization operation (i.e., selling of central bank bonds to the banking system). The buildup of FX reserves induces an initial real exchange rate depreciation of around 3.5% that raises inflation and the monetary policy rate as well. The trade channel triggers a corresponding trade balance surplus. The balance sheet substitution channel is such that the sterilization operation modifies the asset composition of banks’ balance sheet to less lending and more central bank bonds. Finally, the purchase of FX reserves by the central bank induce a financial channel too. The real exchange rate depreciation reduces banks’ net worth and raises currency mismatch at the bank level.

**Figure 9. Response to a Persistent Purchase of FX Reserves**

![Graphs showing responses to a persistent purchase of FX reserves](image)

**Note:** The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state.

Consequently, domestic financial conditions worsens, which is reflected in higher interest rate spreads and lower aggregate credit. The real exchange rate dynamics is such that agents expect an appreciation right after the shock occurs. Therefore, deposit
dollarization increases while credit dollarization falls. The financial and the balance sheet substitution channels outweighs the trade channel. As a result, the persistent and exogenous buildup of FX reserves push the economy to a credit crunch generating a prolonged recession.

It is worth mentioning that the financial channel as well as the balance sheet substitution channel amplify the initial exogenous buildup of FX reserves shock. On the contrary, both channels work as a stabilization mechanism when FX interventions are implemented as a response to external shocks. Figure 10 summarizes the main transmission mechanisms through which FX interventions stabilize financial and macroeconomic volatility.

**Figure 10. Stabilization Channels of FX Interventions**

4.3 Welfare Analysis

We conduct a policy evaluation exercise by computing the welfare gains/costs of one policy regime relative to a different regime. Each policy regime is characterized by its own time-invariant stochastic equilibrium allocation. In particular, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and define two policy regimes denoted by $R$ and $A$. In particular, our benchmark regime $R$ is such that the central bank has two policy instruments: the monetary policy rate under a standard Taylor rule and the FX intervention policy defined by equations (14) and (16) with both policy rules calibrated under our baseline parametrization. On the other hand, the alternative regime $A$ assumes different parametrizations for each policy rule including the absence of FX interventions under a flexible exchange rate regime, i.e., $v_e = 0$.

We define the welfare associated with the equilibrium allocation implied by our bench-
mark policy regime \( r_1 \) conditional on a particular state of the economy in period 0 as

\[
\mathbb{W} \left( \{C_t^R, H_t^R\}_{t \geq 0} \right) \equiv (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \left( C_t^R - H_{t-1}^R \right) \left( H_t^R \right)^{1+\zeta} \right]
\]

where \( \{C_t^R, H_t^R\}_{t \geq 0} \) is a contingent plan for consumption and hours under the policy regime \( \mathcal{R} \). The distinct policy regimes that we consider only change the dynamics of the model economy but not its non-stochastic steady state. Therefore, we compute the welfare associated to each policy regime conditional on the initial state being the non-stochastic steady state of the model economy. The latter ensures that the economy begins from the same initial point under all possible policies. In particular, we compute the welfare gain of regime \( \mathcal{A} \) relative to the benchmark policy regime \( \mathcal{R} \). Let \( \xi_{\text{cond}} \) denote the welfare gain/cost of adopting policy regime \( \mathcal{A} \) instead of the benchmark policy regime \( \mathcal{R} \) conditional that the economy is at non-stochastic steady state at time zero. The parameter \( \xi_{\text{cond}} \) measures the fraction of the benchmark regime consumption process that a household would be willing to accept (or give up) to be as well off under the alternative policy regime \( \mathcal{A} \) as under regime \( \mathcal{R} \). Thus, \( \xi_{\text{cond}} \) is implicitly defined by

\[
\mathbb{W} \left( \{C_t^\mathcal{A}, H_t^\mathcal{A}\}_{t \geq 0} \right) = \mathbb{W} \left( \{(1 + \xi_{\text{cond}})C_t^\mathcal{R}, H_t^\mathcal{R}\}_{t \geq 0} \right)
\]

where \( \{C_t^\mathcal{A}, H_t^\mathcal{A}\}_{t \geq 0} \) is the corresponding contingent plan for consumption and hours under the policy regime \( \mathcal{A} \). Hence, if \( \xi_{\text{cond}} > 0 \) there is a welfare gain while if \( \xi_{\text{cond}} < 0 \) then there is a welfare loss under the alternative regime \( \mathcal{A} \). We approximate \( \xi_{\text{cond}} \) up to a second order of accuracy.

Table 5 shows the welfare gains for different parameter combinations of the Taylor rule and the FX intervention policy rule, conditional to external shocks. We change parameters \( \omega_\pi \) and \( \nu_e \) in order to study the consequences of implementing different policy rules.

**Table 5. Welfare Analysis: \( \xi_{\text{cond}} \times 100\% \)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \omega_\pi ) ( \nu_e )</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Baseline, 9.71</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-22.8</td>
<td>-19.1</td>
<td>-16.6</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline, 1.50</td>
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<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
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<td>5.00</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** The parameter \( \omega_\pi \) controls the policy rate response to fluctuations in inflation. Parameter \( \nu_e \) measures the response of FX interventions to real exchange rate deviations. For each combination of \( (\omega_\pi, \nu_e) \) we compute \( \xi_{\text{cond}} \) which is defined above. Only external shocks are considered.

There are two relevant remarks from this table. First, conditional to external shocks, FX interventions and interest rate policies are effective in reducing macroeconomic volatility and increasing social welfare in a considerable region of the parameter space associated to both policy regimes (i.e., \( \nu_e \) and \( \omega_\pi \)). Second, our model suggests that, given the Taylor coefficient at its baseline level, not responding to the real exchange rate by implementing FX interventions (\( \nu_e = 0 \)) would cause a welfare loss of 6.2% in consumption. These remarks justify the actively use of FX interventions as a additional monetary policy tool aimed to smooth real exchange rate dynamics.
5 Numerical Experiments under more general assumptions

5.1 Distinct assumptions on the financial system

We examine the effectiveness of FX interventions as a response to external shocks under more general assumptions. We compare results under the baseline model with the following extensions:

Case 1: The steady state of the model economy is recalibrated to be consistent with a higher steady state level for the average currency mismatch of the banking system ($x_t$).

Case 2: An economy without financial dollarization. Intermediate good producers borrow from banks only in domestic currency while households are not allowed to hold deposits with banks that are denominated in foreign currency.

Case 3: Household's demand for bank deposits in foreign currency is infinitely responsive to arbitrage opportunities.

Case 4: The size of the currency mismatch affecting bankers' ability to divert funds is assumed to be an aggregate measure of the banking system, and therefore it is taken as given at the individual level.

In case 1, the steady state of the model is re-calibrated to be consistent with 21.4 percent currency mismatch for the banking system instead of 17.2 percent considered in the baseline case (see Table 6). In pursuance of a higher currency mismatch, we target a lower foreign interest rate (0.25 instead of 1.0 percent) relative to our baseline steady state calibration (see Table 6). This additional steady state target induces banks to be more exposed to sudden exchange rate depreciations and currency mismatches. Ceteris paribus, a lower foreign interest rate induces banks to rely more on foreign currency denominated funds but facing, a higher steady state deviation from bank's UIP conditions in both sides of their balance sheet.

Our results suggest that an economy with a higher currency mismatch at the steady state, experiences larger financial and macroeconomic volatility in response to external shocks relative to our baseline economy. We find that conditional on external shocks, the real exchange rate along with the aggregate currency mismatch of the banking system as well as total credit are considerably more volatile under a flexible exchange rate regime when comparing case 1 with our baseline (See Table 8). Likewise, investment and GDP are more volatile under exchange rate flexibility. Therefore, a higher aggregate currency mismatch measure implies that an equilibrium more vulnerable to external shocks. Moreover, in case 1, FX interventions are as effective in reducing aggregate volatility as...
in our baseline case. Table 8 shows the relative volatility between two policy regimes: FX interventions and exchange rate flexibility. In both cases, the real exchange rate volatility is reduced by 70 percent while GDP and investment volatility decreases in 70 and 60 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the volatility of financial variables such as the aggregate currency mismatch and total credit is reduced more in case 1 than in our baseline scenario. The latter result implies that FX interventions are more effective in reducing the volatility of financial variables when the economy faces a higher currency mismatch level, but it is equally effective in the case of macromodular aggregates such as GDP and Investment.

In case 2, we consider an emerging market economy without financial dollarization, where intermediate good producers borrow from banks only in domestic currency (i.e., \( \delta_f = 0 \)) and households are not allowed to hold foreign currency denominated deposits with banks. In this case, the only source of foreign currency denominated funds for the banking system come from borrowing abroad. The steady state of the model is
recalibrated since some endogenous variables, such as \( R^l \) and \( \phi^d \), are not part of the equilibrium equations any more (see Table 6). By the same token, aggregate deposit dollarization in case 2, refers exclusively to foreign borrowing by banks, implying that in steady state, deposit dollarization is revised from 42.5% in the baseline calibration to 23%. Therefore, aggregate currency mismatch increases at steady state from 17.2% to 20.2% leaving the banking system more exposed to exchange rate fluctuations.

Table 8 shows that aggregate volatility under exchange rate flexibility for an economy without domestic financial dollarization (i.e., case 2) is significantly lower than the economy with financial dollarization (i.e., baseline model). Bear in mind, that both economies face the same external shocks, the only difference is the existence of domestic financial dollarization in both sides of banks’ balance sheet. For instance, the volatility of financial variables such as currency mismatch and total credit is reduced by around 80 and 50 percent, respectively. Therefore, the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates such as investment and GDP drop significantly as well. Consequently, our results suggest that, maintaining all else equal, domestic financial dollarization under exchange rate flexibility serves as an amplifier of external shocks, inducing higher aggregate volatility to business cycle fluctuations in EMEs.

Even though, aggregate volatility is importantly reduced under exchange rate flexibility in the economy represented by case 2, FX interventions are still effective to reduce the real exchange rate volatility along with macroeconomic volatility even further. Table 8 shows that the real exchange rate volatility in case 2, is reduced by around 50 percent when FX interventions are active. The latter decline in real exchange rate volatility is lower than the 70 percent drop obtained in our baseline case. Likewise, the reduction in volatility under FX interventions is also carried through total credit, investment and GDP but not as much as in our baseline case. Notably, the volatility of the aggregate currency mismatch increases under the FX intervention regime, which is a direct result of not having domestic credit and deposit dollarization. Recall, that the only source of foreign currency funding for banks is borrowing from abroad (i.e, external credit lines), implying that our measure of currency mismatch absorbs all the volatility associated to it. Consequently, the increment in the volatility of the currency mismatch partially mute the net effectiveness of the FX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Case 1</th>
<th>Case 2</th>
<th>Case 2</th>
<th>Case 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>RER</td>
<td>FXI 7.33</td>
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<td>FXI 9.99</td>
<td>FXI 1.69</td>
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<td>0.18 0.20</td>
<td>0.25 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIP Spread</td>
<td>0.25 1.22</td>
<td>0.36 5.59</td>
<td>0.16 0.15</td>
<td>0.01 0.01</td>
<td>0.00 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.68 2.24</td>
<td>0.85 2.99</td>
<td>0.53 1.34</td>
<td>0.49 0.60</td>
<td>0.37 0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>4.20 11.94</td>
<td>5.35 12.58</td>
<td>3.28 8.03</td>
<td>2.59 2.97</td>
<td>3.42 4.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>0.23 0.25</td>
<td>0.25 0.25</td>
<td>0.20 0.23</td>
<td>0.11 0.12</td>
<td>0.08 0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Credit</td>
<td>1.25 6.81</td>
<td>1.27 16.16</td>
<td>1.60 3.01</td>
<td>0.42 0.66</td>
<td>3.76 4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency Mismatch</td>
<td>2.10 6.08</td>
<td>1.90 12.40</td>
<td>2.32 0.90</td>
<td>0.33 0.24</td>
<td>2.67 2.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Aggregate Volatility Conditional on External Shocks

Note. Standard deviations for major aggregate variables. FXI and FER denote Foreign Exchange Intervention and Flexible Exchange Rate policy regime respectively. The computation consider the external block as the only source of aggregate volatility and it is based on 2500 replications of 120 periods simulated trajectories.
interventions over the aggregate variables.

Next, we explore the role of the real exchange rate smoothing channel by changing the assumptions that affect the presence of endogenous UIP deviations. In our model, for FX interventions to affect significantly real exchange rate dynamics, limits to arbitrage between domestic and foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities must be present for both, households and banks. If there were no limits to arbitrage for at least one of these agents, then our results might change significantly. To see this, recall that there are two endogenous UIP deviations in our baseline model given by

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1} - \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} R^*_t \right) = \kappa_{D^*} \left( D^{-h}_t - D^*_t \right) \quad \text{(UIP Households)}
\]

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \Omega_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1} - \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} R^*_t \right) = \lambda^b \left( \frac{l_t + \omega^* e_t l^*_t + \omega^b b_t}{l_t + e_t l^*_t + b_t} \right) \frac{d\Theta(x^*_t)}{dx^{bank}_t} \quad \text{(UIP Banks)}
\]

In particular, when households are allowed to engage in frictionless arbitrage between domestic and foreign currency denominated bank deposits, there are no endogenous excess returns in equilibrium, i.e., the right-hand side of eq. (UIP Households) converges to zero as \( \kappa_{D^*} \) goes to zero. We examine an approximation of this economy in case 3 (see Table 6) where we set \( \kappa_{D^*} \) at a sufficiently small but positive number. Consequently, the UIP condition for households holds with a constant premium with no endogenous deviations from it. Additionally, in case 3, the incentive compatibility constraint for banks still binds (i.e., \( \lambda^b > 0 \)) implying endogenous deviations from the UIP condition that banks face continue to be present but turn out to be not quantitatively significant, given the nearly limitless arbitrage of households.

Our results (see Table 8) indicate that in case 3, FX interventions do not reduce the real exchange rate volatility relative to the flexible exchange rate regime. Therefore, the real exchange rate smoothing channel is muted in this case. Table 8 also shows that there is still present a small effect of FX interventions over aggregate volatility that emerges from the balance sheet substitution channel because of the sterilization leg of FX interventions. In particular, the volatility of total credit is reduced by around 36 percent while macroeconomic volatility of GDP and investment is reduced by 13 and 17 percent, respectively. Notice that in this case, the volatility of bank’s currency mismatch increases as in case 2 but mostly due to the volatility of foreign borrowing than to domestic deposits in foreign currency.

Likewise, in case 4, banks do not internalize the effects of borrowing in foreign currency on the aggregate currency mismatch of the banking system, i.e., in terms of eq. (UIP Banks), we assume that

\[
\frac{d\Theta(x^*_t)}{dx^{bank}_t} = \frac{d\Theta(x^*_t^{industry})}{dx^{bank}_t} = 0
\]

Then, banks are indifferent between borrowing from domestic depositors and from abroad, implying that the standard UIP condition holds without any endogenous risk premium. Notably in this case, even though the incentive constraint binds (i.e., \( \lambda^b > 0 \)) the response of the real exchange rate to external shocks is similar under FX interventions and exchange rate flexibility. Table 8 shows that FX interventions barely reduce the real exchange volatility. Therefore, like in case 3, the reduction of aggregate volatility of credit,
GDP, and investment (in about 15, 29, and 17 percent, respectively) emerges mainly from the balance sheet substitution channel. This result, together with case 3, differ from Céspedes et al. (2017) and Chang (2019) where FX interventions are irrelevant only when the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind (i.e., \(a^b = 0\) in eq. (UIP Banks)). Our result is due to the indeterminacy of banks’ liability composition that occurs when banks do not internalize the effect of currency mismatch over financial constraints.\(^{22}\)

**Figure 11. Responses to a Persistent Purchase of FX Reserves under Different Generalizations**

Figure 11 displays responses to a sufficiently persistent unanticipated purchase of official FX reserves for each of the extensions considered in this section including our baseline model. Under case 1, the buildup of FX reserves induces the largest real exchange rate depreciation of around 5% while cases 3 and 4 practically show no real exchange rate response. As stated above, the latter result is explained because in case 3 and 4, the UIP condition for banks or households holds with equality even though the incentive constraint for banks still binds (i.e, there are no endogenous deviations from UIP). Therefore, FX interventions are neutral with respect to real exchange rate dynamics. Figure 11 also shows that the implications of muting the real exchange rate smoothing channel are not trivial for the rest of the aggregate variables as credit, GDP, investment, and inflation.

\(^{22}\)Technically, there is one more case that we could examine in our model: when the agency problem does not depend on any currency mismatch measure, i.e., \(\theta(x)\) equals some positive constant for any \(x\). However, we argue that this case implies similar qualitative consequences than case 4. Results are available upon request.
In terms of welfare, our simulations indicate that the welfare loss associated when FX interventions are absent is approximately three times larger under case /one.prop than in the baseline calibration. Table /one.prop (in appendix B) shows that if FX interventions are switched off, \( v_e = 0 \), and the Taylor rule parameter is kept as in the baseline calibration, the economy with higher currency mismatch at the steady-state, experiments a welfare loss of 19.4 percent relative to the 6.2 percent loss of the baseline. When the economy does not face domestic financial dollarization, welfare diminishes by less than in our baseline economy, i.e, the welfare loss associated to no FX interventions is 2.4 percent in terms of consumption (see Table 12 in appendix B). Finally, when FX interventions are neutral in smoothing the real exchange rate response to external shocks (as in case 3 and 4), welfare gains are remarkably close to zero under exchange rate flexibility when compared to the welfare loss in our baseline economy (0.1-0.2% instead of 6.2%, see Tab. 13 and Tab. 14 in appendix B).

5.2 Smoothing exchange rate dynamics using the policy rate

In this subsection, we compare the performance of two policy regimes which are considered to be different ways to implement a managed float for a small open economy: (i) Our baseline policy regime with two monetary instruments, \( i_t \) and \( B_t \), that are set by the following policy rules:

\[
\ln B_t = \ln B - v_e (\ln e_t - \ln e)
\]

\[
i_t - i = \rho_i (i_t-1 - i) + (1 - \rho_i) \left[ \omega_i \pi_t + \omega_y \ln \left( \frac{\text{GDP}_t}{\text{GDP}} \right) \right],
\]

and (ii) An alternative policy regime with the policy interest rate, \( i_t \), as the only monetary instrument following an extended Taylor rule given by:

\[
i_t - i = \rho_i (i_t-1 - i) + (1 - \rho_i) \left[ \omega_i \pi_t + \omega_y \ln \left( \frac{\text{GDP}_t}{\text{GDP}} \right) + \omega_e (\ln e_t - \ln e) \right], \tag{1}
\]

where the Extended Taylor rule responds, not only to inflation and output gap, but also to deviations of the real exchange rate with respect to its steady state value.\(^{23}\)

We compare both policy regimes in terms of conditional macroeconomic volatility to external shocks as well as in terms of welfare. Table 8 shows simulated standard deviations for major macroeconomic variables under both policy regimes as well as under exchange rate flexibility. We consider two different calibrations for the extended Taylor rule in the alternative managed float regime, \( \omega_e = 0.1 \) and \( \omega_e = 1 \) while keeping the rest of the parametrization of the Taylor rule as in the baseline scenario.

\(^{23}\)In line with the spirit of analysing distinct policy rules, but not necessarily related to the exercise in this section, in Appendix B.4, we present responses to external shocks when the central bank FX intervention rule respond to real depreciation or to the interest rate spread between foreign and domestic interest rates instead of responding to real exchange rate deviations. We use the following FX intervention rule:

\[
\ln B_t = (1 - \rho_B) \ln B + \rho_B \ln B_{t-1} - v_e (\ln e_t - \ln e) - v_{\Delta e} \Delta e_t - v_{\text{spread}} \left[ \frac{e_t}{e_{t-1}} R^*_t - R_t \right] - (R^* - R)
\]
Our results suggest that both policy regimes are successful in reducing the conditional exchange rate volatility to external shocks. When the central banks uses FXI interventions together with the standard Taylor rule the exchange rate volatility is reduced from 7.3 percent under exchange rate flexibility to 2.36 percent. On the other hand, when the central bank operates with the extended Taylor rule, the exchange rate volatility decline depends on the response of the policy rate to real exchange rate deviations from steady-state. Depending on the value of $\omega_e$, the central bank is able to manage the exchange rate to the point of reaching a lower standard deviation than the FXI regime, as it can be seen in the third column of Table 8. Notably, the main difference between both managed floating regimes is the volatility of investment relative to exchange rate flexibility. Under the extended Taylor rule policy regime the policy rate partially absorbs the volatility of the real exchange rate which ultimately is transmitted to investment volatility. In Table 8, the volatility of investment is considerably higher under both extended Taylor rules than under exchange rate flexibility. Therefore, when the central bank use its policy rate to respond to exchange rate fluctuations, it fails to smooth the response of investment relative to the exchange rate flexibility regime.

As in Section 4.3, our welfare analysis defines the welfare gain/loss, $\zeta_{\text{cond}}$ by

$$W\left(\{C^R_t, H^R_t\}_{t \geq 0}\right) = W\left(\{(1 + \zeta_{\text{cond}})C^\mathcal{A}_t, H^\mathcal{A}_t\}_{t \geq 0}\right)$$

where the $\mathcal{R}$ regime refers to the baseline policy regime, $\omega_\pi = 1.50$, $\omega_e = 0$, and $v_e = 9.71$, while the alternative regime $\mathcal{A}$, is specified by a combination of different values for $\omega_e$ and $\omega_\pi$ for the extended Taylor rule regime. Table 9 shows welfare losses for the extended Taylor rule regime. Our results indicate that, for a non-trivial region of the parameter space, even when the central bank has the policy interest rate as the only monetary instrument responding to real exchange rate deviations, $\omega_e \geq 0$, there are significant welfare losses relative to our baseline model ($\omega_\pi = 1.5$, $\omega_e = 0.0$, $v_e = 9.7$). Moreover, when compared to

---

**Table 8. Aggregate Volatility Conditional on External Shocks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FER</th>
<th>Extended Taylor (1)</th>
<th>Extended Taylor (2)</th>
<th>FXI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RER</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIP Spread</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>11.96</td>
<td>15.34</td>
<td>22.19</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Credit</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency Mismatch</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** “FER” is the abbreviation for the Flexible Exchange Rate regimen, “Extended Taylor (1)” for the regime where the alternative Taylor rule is implemented with $\omega_e = 0.1$ and $v_e = 0$, “Extended Taylor (2)” refers to the alternative Taylor rule with $\omega_e = 1$ and $v_e = 0$, and “FXI” is the abbreviation for Foreign Exchange Intervention regimen with the standard Taylor rule, $\omega_e = 0$. The computation only considers external shock volatilities and is based on 2500 replications of 120 periods simulated trajectories.

We obtain very similar results with both FX intervention rules under a proper calibration of these different types of FX rule. But we suggest that an FX intervention rule in terms of interest rate spreads is not as implementable as an FX intervention rule that responds to exchange rate deviations from steady-state.
the regime identified by \((\omega_\pi = 1.5, \omega_e = 1.5, u_e = 0)\). Table 9 also shows that for a subspace of the policy parameter region of the extended Taylor rule, increasing the response of the policy rate to real exchange rate deviations from steady-state reduces the welfare loss (i.e., it is welfare improving) but not as much as in the FXI policy regime. For example, when \(\omega_\pi = 1.5\) as in our baseline calibration, increasing \(\omega_e\) from zero to five reduces welfare losses by 2.4 percentage points in consumption. Under the baseline policy regime, increasing the response of FX interventions to exchange rate deviations from steady-state, reduces welfare losses in 4.2 percent points (see Table 5 in Section 4.3).

Moreover, under the extended Taylor rule regime, increasing \(\omega_e\) may produce indeterminacy for the rational expectations equilibrium.

Table 9. Welfare Analysis: \(\zeta_{cond} \times 100\%\), Extended Taylor Rule regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(\omega_\pi \backslash \omega_e)</th>
<th>Baseline, 0.0</th>
<th>0.1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1.0</th>
<th>2.0</th>
<th>5.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-22.8</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline, 1.50</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The parameter \(\omega_\pi\) controls the policy rate response to fluctuations in inflation. Parameter \(\omega_e\) measures the response of an alternative Taylor rule to real exchange rate deviations:

\[
i_t - i = \rho_1(i_{t-1} - i) + (1 - \rho_1) \left[ \omega_\pi \pi_t + \omega_e \ln \left( \frac{GDP}{GDP} \right) + \omega_e (\ln e_t - \ln e) \right]
\]

For each combination of \((\omega_\pi, \omega_e)\) we compute \(\zeta_{cond}\) which is defined above eliminating the response of FX interventions to real exchange rate \((u_e = 0)\) in the \(A\) regime and keeping our baseline as the \(R\) regime. Only external shocks are considered.

6 Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have proposed a macroeconomic model with financial frictions for a small open economy to analyze and quantify the effectiveness of FX interventions in stabilizing the impact of external shocks. FX interventions are modeled as an unconventional monetary policy tool that operates simultaneously with the conventional policy rate tool. More specifically, in our model FX interventions are considered a balance sheet policy induced by an agency problem between banks and their investors (i.e, domestic depositors and foreign lenders). Three key assumptions are important for our results. First, the severity of banks’ agency problem depends directly on a measure of currency mismatch at the bank level. Second, the banking system is partially dollarized on both sides of its balance sheet and exposed to potential currency mismatches. On one hand, intermediate good producers must borrow a bundle of loan services from banks in order to produce. The composition of this bundle consists of a combination between domestic and foreign currency denominated loans. On the other hand, households are allowed to hold deposits with banks that are denominated in domestic and foreign currency. But we introduce limits on household foreign currency denominated deposits as a way to capture incomplete...
arbitrage. Third, FX intervention is such that the central bank leans against the wind with respect to exchange rate fluctuations but in a sterilized manner.

Our results shed light on the transmission mechanism of FX interventions. In particular, we highlight two reinforcing effects when responding to external shocks: the exchange rate smoothing channel and the balance sheet substitution channel or crowding out effect over bank lending. The former channel is active whenever banks and households are not able to seize arbitrage opportunities between domestic and foreign currency denominated deposits and assets implying endogenous deviations from UIP. Instead, if either banks or households are able to engage in frictionless arbitrage between domestic and foreign currency denominated asset returns, the standard UIP equation holds and this channel is no longer active. On the other hand, the balance sheet substitution channel stems from the sterilization operation associated to FX interventions which modifies the supply of central bank bonds in banks’ balance sheet and, with it, their asset composition. Our quantitative results suggest that the latter channel is less significant than the former one.

An interesting result arises when banks do not internalize the effects of borrowing in foreign currency on the aggregate currency mismatch of the banking system. In this case, banks are indifferent between borrowing from domestic depositors and from abroad, implying that the standard UIP condition holds without any endogenous risk premium. As a result, FX interventions are less effective in stabilizing the economy in the presence of external shocks. Notably in this case, even though the incentive constraint binds the response of the real exchange rate to external shocks is the same under FX interventions and exchange rate flexibility. This result differs from Céspedes et al. (2017) and Chang (2019) where FX interventions are irrelevant only when the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind. In sum, in our framework, for FX interventions to affect significantly the real exchange rate and excess returns along with the aggregate equilibrium of the economy, limits to arbitrage between domestic and foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities must be present for both, households and banks.

We consider that the financial friction view of FX interventions needs further research. For instance, it differs from the unconventional monetary policy framework for closed economies in several ways. First, FX interventions have been implemented effectively even in normal times in EMEs, contrary to the unconventional monetary policy tools studied in the context of closed economies. In the latter case, once the effective lower bound is reached, unconventional tools may be deployed. Second, what really matters for EMEs is how tight financial constraints are, and not necessarily if they bind or not. Third, in practice, the communication of FX interventions is at odds with the communication of unconventional policies in closed economies. For example, it seems that there is much less forward guidance associated with FX interventions than with QE or LSAP. Finally, the effective lower bound for EMEs may not only be related to the nominal interest rate, but also to a non-negative amount of official FX reserves needed to implement FX interventions within an inflation-targeting regime.
References


A Parametrization

We set the steady-state targets based on Peruvian banking system data. First, calibrate the consolidated balance sheet of the banking system in the model using data for Peru to obtain historical averages for the aggregate currency mismatch level and foreign currency liabilities as a fraction of total assets. We use data on domestic currency credit for $L_t$, dollar denominated credit for $L^*_t$ and total banking investment for $B_t$. We use data on banks’ net worth for $N_t$ and the sum of foreign currency deposits and external liabilities for measuring $D^*_t$. Figure 12 plots the evolution of the bank’s balance sheet composition that we used to fix the model’s steady-state variables.

**Figure 12. Bank’s Balance Sheet Composition**

Note. We use data on domestic currency credit for $L_t$, dollar denominated credit for $L^*_t$ and total banking investment for $B_t$. We use data on banks’ net worth for $N_t$ and the sum of foreign currency deposits and external liabilities for measuring $D^*_t$.

Moreover, we use the average of domestic (foreign) currency prime, corporate, and big company loan’s interest rate as our measure of domestic (foreign) currency lending return. Figure 13 shows the Peruvian banking system interest rate spread. Similarly, Figure 14 presents the aggregate real ratios used to fix the demand side steady state of the economy.

Finally, Table 10 summarizes the baseline parametrization used to fix some steady state targets.
**Figure 13. Banking System Interest Rate Spread**

- $i = 3.6$
- $R^* - R = 1.8$
- $(1 + \Delta e)R^* - R = 0.27$
- $(1 + \Delta e)R^* - R^* = 2.5$

**Figure 14. Real Aggregate Ratios**

- $C = 62, 63.2$
- $I = 15, 20.2$
- $G = 15, 15.8$
- $Y_{x,c} = 58, 59.1$
- $B = 18, 23.4$
**Table 10. Targeted Parametrization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banking Sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Interest Rate</td>
<td>$R^*$</td>
<td>1.015/4</td>
<td>Foreign Rate</td>
<td>$R^*$</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Interest Rate</td>
<td>$R$</td>
<td>1.041/4</td>
<td>Subjective Discount Factor</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic C. Loans Return</td>
<td>$R^1$</td>
<td>1.061/4</td>
<td>Foreign C. Loans Participation</td>
<td>$\omega^a$</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign C. Loans Return</td>
<td>$R^1s$</td>
<td>1.041/4</td>
<td>Bonds Loans Participation</td>
<td>$\omega^b$</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB Bond Return</td>
<td>$R^b$</td>
<td>1.041/4</td>
<td>Banker's Survival Rate</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Liability to Asset</td>
<td>$\frac{dF}{dA}$</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>Moral Hazard 1</td>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic C. Leverage</td>
<td>$\frac{dA}{dL}$</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>Moral Hazard 2</td>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>7.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Dollarization</td>
<td>$\frac{dA}{dC}$</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>DC Bias in Loans</td>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Banking Sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Return</td>
<td>$R^k$</td>
<td>1.081/4</td>
<td>Loans Aggregator Scale</td>
<td>$A^p$</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked Hours</td>
<td>$H$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$</td>
<td>Labor Disutility Scale</td>
<td>$\zeta_0$</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Exchange Rate</td>
<td>$e$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Foreign Output</td>
<td>$Y^*$</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Price</td>
<td>$p^{nc}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commodity Price</td>
<td>$p^{nc}$</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>$GDP$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Non Commodity Productivity</td>
<td>$A^{nc}$</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity to Total Export</td>
<td>$\frac{V^{nc}}{V}$</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>Commodity Returns to Scale</td>
<td>$a^c$</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity to Non Commodity Inv.</td>
<td>$\frac{T^{nc}}{T}$</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>Commodity Sector Productivity</td>
<td>$A^c$</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Capital financed by households</td>
<td>$\frac{K}{GDP}$</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>Capital Share</td>
<td>$a^k$</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Foreign FC Deposits</td>
<td>$\frac{D^{nc}}{D}$</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Ef. Household's Capital</td>
<td>$\overline{D}$</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption to GDP</td>
<td>$\frac{C^{nc}}{GDP}$</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>Ef. Household's FC Deposits</td>
<td>$\overline{D}^{nc}$</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment to GDP</td>
<td>$\frac{I^{nc}}{GDP}$</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Imported Input Share</td>
<td>$a^{nu}$</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Purchases to GDP</td>
<td>$\frac{G^{nc}}{GDP}$</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Gov. Expenditure</td>
<td>$G$</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FX Reserves to GDP - Anual</td>
<td>$\frac{CB}{GDP}$</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>CB Bonds</td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B Additional Tables and Figures**

**B.1 Additional Welfare Analysis Tables**

**Table 11. Welfare Analysis: $\zeta_{cond} \times 100\%$ - Case 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\omega_n \backslash u_v$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Baseline, 9.71</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-36.6</td>
<td>-25.4</td>
<td>-21.7</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline, 1.50</td>
<td>-19.4</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>-11.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The parameter $\omega_n$ controls the policy rate response to fluctuations in inflation. Parameter $u_v$ measures the response of FX interventions to real exchange rate deviations. For each combination of $(\omega_n, u_v)$ we compute $\zeta_{cond}$ which is defined above. Only external shocks are considered.
### Table 12. Welfare Analysis: $\zeta_{\text{cond}} \times 100\%$ - Case 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\omega_n \backslash u_e$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Baseline, 9.71</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline, 1.50</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** The parameter $\omega_n$ controls the policy rate response to fluctuations in inflation. Parameter $u_e$ measures the response of FX interventions to real exchange rate deviations. For each combination of $(\omega_n, u_e)$ we compute $\zeta_{\text{cond}}$ which is defined above. Only external shocks are considered.

### Table 13. Welfare Analysis: $\zeta_{\text{cond}} \times 100\%$ - Case 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\omega_n \backslash u_e$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Baseline, 9.71</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline, 1.50</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** The parameter $\omega_n$ controls the policy rate response to fluctuations in inflation. Parameter $u_e$ measures the response of FX interventions to real exchange rate deviations. For each combination of $(\omega_n, u_e)$ we compute $\zeta_{\text{cond}}$ which is defined above. Only external shocks are considered.

### Table 14. Welfare Analysis: $\zeta_{\text{cond}} \times 100\%$ - Case 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\omega_n \backslash u_e$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Baseline, 9.71</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline, 1.50</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** The parameter $\omega_n$ controls the policy rate response to fluctuations in inflation. Parameter $u_e$ measures the response of FX interventions to real exchange rate deviations. For each combination of $(\omega_n, u_e)$ we compute $\zeta_{\text{cond}}$ which is defined above. Only external shocks are considered.

### B.2 Figures and Tables for Case 0: Perfect Substitution among Bank’s Asset

The parametrization of the baseline model implies that central bank bonds are harder to deviate relative to loans (i.e., $\omega_n > 1 > \omega^b$). Since central bank bonds are the only sterilization instrument that the central bank is able to use, the role of FX interventions in mitigating the impact of external shocks is limited by the value of $\omega^b$. In case 0, bank...
assets enter the incentive constraint with equal weights (i.e., $\omega^* = \omega^b = 1$). In other words, domestic currency loans and central bank bounds become perfect substitutes as in Chang (2019). Hence, the central bank bonds have a higher impact on the total amount of divertible funds and ultimately on banks' lending capacity. As a result, FX interventions are more effective as an external shock absorber in this case than in our baseline model.

**Table 15. Welfare Analysis: $\zeta_{\text{cond}} \times 100\%$ - Perfect Substitutes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\omega_n$ (v_t)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Baseline, 9.71</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-24.5</td>
<td>-19.5</td>
<td>-16.1</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline, 1.50</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The parameter $\omega_n$ controls the policy rate response to fluctuations in inflation. Parameter $v_t$ measures the response of FX interventions to real exchange rate deviations. For each combination of $(\omega_n, v_t)$ we compute $\zeta_{\text{cond}}$ which is defined above. Only external shocks are considered.

**Figure 15. Foreign Interest Rate Shock: Perfect Substitution in Bank’s assets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>Trade Balance/GDP</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Credit</td>
<td>Currency Mismatch</td>
<td>Net Worth</td>
<td>CB Bonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RER</td>
<td>$E[R^{\text{real}} - R]$</td>
<td>$E[R' - R]$</td>
<td>$E[(1+\Delta) R' - R]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state. $E_t \left[ \frac{\omega_n}{\omega_n} R_{t+1}^{\ast} - R_{t+1} \right]$ measures the relative cost of borrowing in foreign currency from the point of view of banks.
**Figure 16. Commodity Price Shock: Perfect Substitution in Bank’s Assets**

Note. The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state. \( \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{e^{R_s}}{e^{r_{f+1}} - e^{r_{f+1}}} \right] \) measures the relative cost of borrowing in foreign currency from the point of view of banks.
**Figure 17. Global Demand Shock: Perfect Substitution in Bank’s Assets**

![Graphs of various economic indicators under different conditions](image)

**Note.** The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state. \( \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{r_{t+1}}{r_t} R^*_{t+1} - R_{t+1} \right] \) measures the relative cost of borrowing in foreign currency from the point of view of banks.
B.3 Figures for Foreign Demand Shock

**Figure 18. Baseline**

**Figure 19. Generalizations of the Model under FER**
B.4 Distinct FX Intervention Rules

**Figure 20. Foreign Interest Rate Shock**

Note. "Δe Rule" considers ρ_B = 0.999 and v_{Δe} = 10. The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state. E_t \left[ \frac{\Delta e_t}{e_t} R_{t+1}^* - R_{t+1} \right] measures the relative cost of borrowing in foreign currency from the point of view of banks.

**Figure 21. Commodity Price Shock**

Note. "Δe Rule" considers ρ_B = 0.999 and v_{Δe} = 10 and "Spread Rule" calibrates ρ_B = 0.999 and v_{spread} = 7. The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state. E_t \left[ \frac{\Delta e_t}{e_t} R_{t+1}^* - R_{t+1} \right] measures the relative cost of borrowing in foreign currency from the point of view of banks.
**Figure 22. Foreign Output Shock**

Note. "Δe Rule" considers \( \rho_B = 0.999 \) and \( \nu_{\Delta e} = 10 \) and "Spread Rule" calibrates \( \rho_B = 0.999 \) and \( \nu_{\text{spread}} = 7 \). The response of each quantity or index variable is presented as percent deviation from its steady-state, while the response of any rate variable is displayed in percentage-point deviations from its steady-state. 

\[ \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\text{RER}_t}{\text{RER}_t} \right] - R_{t+1} \] measures the relative cost of borrowing in foreign currency from the point of view of banks.

C Model Solution

C.1 The Financial System

**Solving Bank’s Problem.** Recursive version for banker's problem:

\[
V_t = \max_{l_t, l_t^*, b_t, d_t, d_t^*} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left\{ (1 - \sigma) n_{t+1} + \sigma V_{t+1} \right\} \right]
\]

subject to:

\[
l_t + e_t l_t^* + b_t = n_t + d_t + e_t d_t^*
\]

\[
n_{t+1} = R_{t+1} l_t + R_{t+1} l_t^* + R_{t+1}^b b_t - R_{t+1} d_t - e_t R_{t+1}^d d_t^*
\]

\[
x_t = \frac{e_t d_t^* - e_t l_t^*}{l_t + e_t l_t^* + b_t}
\]

\[
V_t \geq \Theta(x_t) \left[ l_t + \omega e_t l_t^* + \omega b_t \right]
\]

Let \( \psi_t = \frac{V_t}{n_t}, \phi_t^l = \frac{l_t}{n_t}, \phi_t^t = \frac{e_t l_t}{n_t} \), and \( \phi_t^b = \frac{b_t}{n_t} \), then the objective function can be rewritten as

\[
\psi_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} (1 - \sigma + \sigma \psi_{t+1}) \frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} \right]
\]

Using the law of motion for bank's net worth, we can rearrange:

\[
\frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} = R_{t+1}^l \frac{l_t}{n_t} + R_{t+1}^l l_t^* \frac{e_t l_t^*}{n_t} + R_{t+1}^b \frac{b_t}{n_t} - R_{t+1} d_t \frac{d_t}{n_t}
\]
\[- R^{*}_{t+1} \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} \left( l_t + e_t l^*_t + b_t \right) \left( e_t d^*_t - e_t l^*_t + e_t l^*_t \right) \]

\[\frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} = R^l_{t+1} \phi^l_t + \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} \left( R^l_{t+1} - R^*_t \right) \phi^l_t + R^b_{t+1} \phi^b_t - R^*_t \left( l_t + e_t l^*_t + b_t \right) \left( l_t + e_t l^*_t + b_t \right) \]

\[+ \frac{b_t}{n_t} - 1 - \frac{e_t d^*_t}{n_t} \right] - \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} R^*_t \left( \phi^l_t + \phi^l_t + \phi^b_t \right) x_t \]

\[\frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} = R^l_{t+1} \phi^l_t + \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} \left( R^l_{t+1} - R^*_t \right) \phi^l_t + R^b_{t+1} \phi^b_t \]

\[- R_{t+1} \left[ \phi^l_t + \phi^b_t - 1 - \left( \phi^l_t + \phi^l_t + \phi^b_t \right) x_t \right] - \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} R^*_t \left( \phi^l_t + \phi^l_t + \phi^b_t \right) x_t \]

Thus, bank's problem can be rewritten as the following form:

\[\psi_t = \max_{\phi^l_t, \phi^l_t, \phi^b_t, x_t} \mu^l_t \phi^l_t + \left( \mu^l_t + \mu^b_t \right) \phi^l_t + \mu^b_t \phi^b_t + \mu^b_t \left( \phi^l_t + \phi^l_t + \phi^b_t \right) x_t + v_t \]

subject to:

\[\psi_t - \Theta(x_t) \left[ \phi^l_t + \omega^* \phi^l_t + \omega^b \phi^b_t \right] \geq 0 \]

where

\[\mu^l_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} \left( R^l_{t+1} - R^*_t \right) \right] \]

\[\mu^b_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} \left( R^b_{t+1} - R^*_t \right) \right] \]

\[\mu^d_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} \left( R^d_{t+1} - R^*_t \right) \right] \]

\[\psi_t - \Theta(x_t) \left[ \phi^l_t + \omega^* \phi^l_t + \omega^b \phi^b_t \right] \geq 0 \]

\[\Omega_{t+1} = \Lambda_{t+1} \left( 1 - \sigma + \sigma_{\psi_{t+1}} \right) \]

We can interpret \( \Omega_{t+1} \) as the stochastic discount factor of the banker, \( \mu^l_t \) as the excess return of domestic currency loans over home deposit, \( \mu^l_t \) is the excess return of foreign currency loans over home deposit, \( \mu^b_t \) the excess return of sterilized bonds over home deposit, and \( \mu^d_t \) as the cost advantage of foreign currency debt over home deposit. Note that at the optimal ratios, the following equation will be satisfied:

\[\psi_t = \mu^l_t \phi^l_t + \left( \mu^l_t + \mu^b_t \right) \phi^l_t + \mu^b_t \phi^b_t + \mu^b_t \left( \phi^l_t + \phi^l_t + \phi^b_t \right) x_t + v_t \]

(7)

Let \( \lambda^b_t \) be the Lagrange multiplier of the associated incentive restriction, then the problem becomes:

\[\mathcal{L}_t = \max_{\phi^l_t, \phi^l_t, \phi^b_t, x_t} \mu^l_t \phi^l_t + \left( \mu^l_t + \mu^b_t \right) \phi^l_t + \mu^b_t \phi^b_t + \mu^b_t \left( \phi^l_t + \phi^l_t + \phi^b_t \right) x_t + v_t \]

64
\[
+ \lambda^b_t \left[ \mu^i_t \phi^i_t + (\mu^{i*}_t + \mu^{d*}_t) \phi^{i*}_t + \mu^b_t \phi^b_t + \mu^{d*}_t \left( \phi^i_t + \phi^{i*}_t + \phi^b_t \right) x_t + v_t \right]
- \Theta(x_t) \left( \phi^i_t + \omega^* \phi^{i*}_t + \omega^b \phi^b_t \right)
\]

Then, the first order conditions (FOCs) for this problem are:

\[
\begin{align*}
\phi^i_t : & \quad (1 + \lambda^b_t) [\mu^i_t + \mu^{d*}_t x_t] - \lambda^b_t \Theta(x_t) = 0 \\
\phi^{i*}_t : & \quad (1 + \lambda^b_t) [\mu^{i*}_t + \mu^{d*}_t + \mu^{d*}_t x_t] - \omega^* \lambda^b_t \Theta(x_t) = 0 \\
\phi^b_t : & \quad (1 + \lambda^b_t) [\mu^b_t + \mu^{d*}_t x_t] - \omega^b \lambda^b_t \Theta(x_t) = 0 \\
x_t : & \quad (1 + \lambda^b_t) \mu^{d*}_t \left( \phi^i_t + \phi^{i*}_t + \phi^b_t \right) - \lambda^b_t \left( \phi^i_t + \omega^* \phi^{i*}_t + \omega^b \phi^b_t \right) \partial_x \Theta(x_t) = 0 \\
\text{slackness:} & \quad \lambda^b_t \left[ \psi_t \Theta(x_t) \left( \phi^i_t + \omega^* \phi^{i*}_t + \omega^b \phi^b_t \right) \right] = 0
\end{align*}
\]

We assume that \( \lambda^b_t > 0 \) and the incentive constraint is binding. Thus

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu^i_t + \mu^{d*}_t x_t &= \frac{\lambda^b_t}{1 + \lambda^b_t} \Theta(x_t) \\
\mu^{i*}_t + \mu^{d*}_t (1 + x_t) &= \frac{\lambda^b_t}{1 + \lambda^b_t} \Theta(x_t) \\
\mu^b_t + \mu^{d*}_t x_t &= \frac{\lambda^b_t}{1 + \lambda^b_t} \Theta(x_t) \\
\mu^{d*}_t \left( \phi^i_t + \phi^{i*}_t + \phi^b_t \right) &= \frac{\lambda^b_t}{1 + \lambda^b_t} \left( \phi^i_t + \omega^* \phi^{i*}_t + \omega^b \phi^b_t \right) \partial_x \Theta(x_t) \\
\Theta(x_t) \left( \phi^i_t + \omega^* \phi^{i*}_t + \omega^b \phi^b_t \right) &= \left( \mu^i_t + \mu^{d*}_t x_t \right) \phi^i_t + \left( \mu^{i*}_t + \mu^{d*}_t x_t \right) \phi^{i*}_t + \left( \mu^b_t + \mu^{d*}_t x_t \right) \phi^b_t + v_t
\end{align*}
\]

Dividing the first condition by the second and third:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu^{i*}_t &= \omega^* \mu^i_t - \left[ (1 - \omega^* \mu^i_t) x_t + 1 \right] \mu^{d*}_t \\
\mu^b_t &= \omega^b \mu^i_t - \left[ (1 - \omega^b \mu^i_t) \mu^{d*}_t x_t \right]
\end{align*}
\]

Considering the incentive constraint we can rearrange to obtain:

\[
\begin{align*}
\phi^i_t &= \Phi_t - \omega^* \phi^{i*}_t - \omega^b \phi^b_t \\
\Phi_t &= \frac{v_t}{\Theta(x_t) - (\mu^i_t + \mu^{d*}_t x_t)}
\end{align*}
\]

Note \( \Phi_t \) defines the maximum weighted leverage ratio induced by the moral hazard problem\(^{24}\). We can see that, whenever \( \omega^*, \omega^b > 0 \), private loans and sterilized bonds are substitutes in the portfolio of banks.

\(^{24}\)Note that this restriction can be rewritten as:

\[
l_t \leq \theta_t, n_t
\]

where \( \theta_t = \Phi_t - \omega^* \phi^{i*}_t - \omega^b \phi^b_t \). This type of collateral constraint were popularized by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and is used in Chang (2019) to capture foreign debt limits that are faced by the financial system in emerging economies.
Using the fourth optimality condition:

\[
\mu_t^{d^e} \left( \phi_t^l + \phi_t^{l^*} + \phi_t^b \right) = \left( \mu_t^l + \mu_t^{d^e} x_t \right) \frac{\partial \Theta(x_t)}{\Theta(x_t)} \Phi_t
\]

\[
\mu_t^{d^e} \left( \Phi_t + (1 - \omega^*) \phi_t^{l^*} + (1 - \omega^b) \phi_t^b \right) = \left( \mu_t^l + \mu_t^{d^e} x_t \right) \frac{\partial \Theta(x_t)}{\Theta(x_t)} \Phi_t
\]

\[
\mu_t^{d^e} \left( \Phi_t + (1 - \omega^*) \phi_t^{l^*} + (1 - \omega^b) \phi_t^b \right) = \left( \mu_t^l + \mu_t^{d^e} x_t \right) \frac{\partial \Theta(x_t)}{\Theta(x_t)} \Phi_t
\]

\[
\mu_t^{d^e} (1 - \omega^*) \phi_t^{l^*} + \mu_t^{d^e} (1 - \omega^b) \phi_t^b = \left( \mu_t^l + \mu_t^{d^e} x_t \right) \frac{\partial \Theta(x_t)}{\Theta(x_t)} - \mu_t^{d^e} \right] \Phi_t
\]

Hence, the fifth equation for solving bank's problem is\(^{25}\):

\[
(1 - \omega^*) \phi_t^{l^*} + (1 - \omega^b) \phi_t^b = \left( \mu_t^l + \mu_t^{d^e} x_t \right) \frac{\partial \Theta(x_t)}{\Theta(x_t)} - 1 \right] \Phi_t
\]

(12)

**Financial System Aggregation.** We have solved the problem for an individual bank but not for the aggregate banking sector. From eq. (8), we see that the determination of the foreign debt - weighted asset ratio does not depend on bank-specific factors, then this equation is also satisfied at entire banking sector. The same logic applies for eq. (9), eq. (10), eq. (12). Then,

\[
\phi_t^l = \frac{L_t}{N_t}
\]

(13)

\[
\phi_t^{l^*} = \frac{e_t L_t^*}{N_t}
\]

(14)

\[
\phi_t^b = \frac{B_t}{N_t}
\]

(15)

\[
x_t = \frac{e_t D_t^* - e_t L_t^*}{L_t + e_t L_t^* + B_t}
\]

(16)

Since the aggregate level of sterilized bonds \(B_t\) are determined by the monetary authority and \(N_t\) is a state variable, then, in the whole financial system, \(\phi_t^b\) is given. However, now the vector \((R_t^l, R_t^{l^*}, R_t^b)\) is not given anymore. The equations which help in the determination of this vector is the law of motion of the aggregated bank’s net worth and credit demand functions. The aggregate net worth of banks evolves according to

\[
N_{t+1} = \sigma \left( R_{t+1}^l L_t + R_{t+1}^{l^*} e_{t+1} L_t^* + R_{t+1}^b B_t - R_{t+1} D_t - e_{t+1} R_{t+1}^* D_t^* \right)
\]

\[
+ \xi \left( R_{t+1}^l L_t + R_{t+1}^{l^*} e_{t+1} L_t^* + R_{t+1}^b B_t \right)
\]

\[
N_{t+1} = (\sigma + \xi) \left( R_{t+1}^l L_t + R_{t+1}^{l^*} e_{t+1} L_t^* + R_{t+1}^b B_t \right) - \sigma R_{t+1} D_t - \xi e_{t+1} R_{t+1}^* D_t^*
\]

(17)

\(^{25}\)Note that if \(1 = \omega^*\) and \(1 = \omega^b\), we arrive to the a similar solution of Aoki et al. (2018):

\[
1 = \left( \frac{\mu_t^{l^*} + x_t}{\mu_t^{l^*}} \right) \frac{\partial \Theta(x_t)}{\Theta(x_t)}
\]

If \(\omega^* = \omega^b = 1\), we get the same solution of Aoki et al. (2018) for the whole financial system since returns are the same across different types of assets.
Aggregate Currency Mismatch - Case 3. Given $x_t$ and $n_t$,

$$V_t = \max_{l_t, l_t^*, b_t, d_t^*} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left\{ (1 - \sigma) n_{t+1} + \sigma V_{t+1} \right\} \right]$$

subject to:

$$l_t + e_t l_t^* + b_t = n_t + d_t + e_t d_t^*$$

$$n_{t+1} = R_{t+1} l_t + R_{t+1} l_t^* + R_{t+1} b_t - R_{t+1} d_t - e_{t+1} R_{t+1} d_t^*$$

$$V_t \geq \Theta(x_t) \left[ l_t + \omega^* e_t l_t^* + \omega^* b_t \right]$$

Let $\psi_t = \frac{v_t}{n_t}$, $\phi_t^l = \frac{l_t}{n_t}$, $\phi_t^l = \frac{e_t l_t}{n_t}$, and $\phi_t^b = \frac{b_t}{n_t}$, then the objective function can be rewritten as

$$\psi_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( 1 - \sigma + \sigma \psi_{t+1} \frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} \right) \right]$$

Moreover, let $\phi_t^{d*} = \frac{e_t d_t^*}{n_t}$

$$\frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} = \frac{R_{t+1} l_t^{*} + R_{t+1} l_t^{*} e_t + R_{t+1} b_t - R_{t+1} d_t - e_{t+1} R_{t+1} d_t^*}{n_t}$$

$$\frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} = \frac{R_{t+1} l_t + R_{t+1} l_t^* + R_{t+1} b_t - R_{t+1} d_t}{n_t} - \frac{e_{t+1} R_{t+1} d_t^*}{e_t}$$

$$\frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} = \left[ R_{t+1} - R_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1} e_t \right) - R_{t+1} \left( \phi_t^l + \phi_t^l - \phi_t^b + 1 - \phi_t^{d*} \right) - R_{t+1} e_t \phi_t^{d*} \right]$$

Then, the bank’s problem can be rewritten as

$$\psi_t = \max_{\phi_t^l, \phi_t^l, \phi_t^l, \phi_t^{d*}} \mu_t^l \phi_t^l + \mu_t^l \phi_t^l + \mu_t^b \phi_t^b + \mu_t^d \phi_t^{d*} + v_t$$

subject to:

$$\psi_t - \Theta(x_t) \left[ \phi_t^l + \omega^* \phi_t^l + \omega^* \phi_t^b \right] \geq 0$$

FOCs

$$\phi_t^l : \quad (1 + \lambda_t) \mu_t^l - \lambda_t \Theta(x_t) = 0$$

$$\phi_t^{l*} : \quad (1 + \lambda_t) \mu_t^{l*} - \omega^* \lambda_t \Theta(x_t) = 0$$

$$\phi_t^b : \quad (1 + \lambda_t) \mu_t^b - \omega^* \lambda_t \Theta(x_t) = 0$$

$$\phi_t^{d*} : \quad (1 + \lambda_t) \mu_t^{d*} = 0$$

slackness : \quad \lambda_t^b \left[ \psi_t - \Theta(x_t) \left( \phi_t^l + \omega^* \phi_t^l + \omega^* \phi_t^b \right) \right] = 0$$

Rearranging

$$\mu_t^{d*} = 0$$

$$\mu_t^{l*} = \omega^* \mu_t^l$$

$$\mu_t^b = \omega^* \mu_t^l$$

thus

$$\psi = \mu_t^l \Phi_t + v_t$$

Hence,

$$\Phi_t = \frac{v_t}{\Theta(x_t) - \mu_t^l}$$
C.2 Solving Worker’s Problem

Objective Function:

\[ U_t = (1 - \beta)\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \left( C_{t+j} - \mathcal{H} C_{t+j-1} - \frac{\zeta_0}{1 + \zeta} H_{t+j}^{1+\zeta} \right)^{1-\gamma} \right] \]

Budget Restriction:

\[ C_t + D_t + B_t^e + e_t \left[ D_t^* + h \left( D_t^* + h - \mathbb{D}^* \right)^2 \right] + \left[ S_t + \frac{K_S}{2} (S_t - \bar{S})^2 \right] + T_t \]

\[ = \omega_t H_t + \Pi_t + R_t D_{t-1} + R_t e_t D^* + R_t^{kn} S_{t-1} \]

First Order Conditions:

\[ \mathbb{E}_t u_{ct} w_t = \zeta_0 H_t \left( C_t - \mathcal{H} C_{t-1} - \frac{\zeta_0}{1 + \zeta} H_t^{1+\zeta} \right)^{-\gamma} \]

\[ 1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ R_{t+1} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \right] \]

\[ D_t^* = \mathbb{D}^* + \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( \frac{\zeta_0}{e_t} R_{t+1} - R_{t+1} \right) \right]}{K_D} \]

\[ S_t = \bar{S} + \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( R_{t+1}^{S} - R_{t+1} \right) \right]}{K_S} \]

with

\[ u_{ct} = \left( C_t - \mathcal{H} C_{t-1} - \frac{\zeta_0}{1 + \zeta} H_t^{1+\zeta} \right)^{-\gamma} - \mathcal{H} \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left( C_{t+1} - \mathcal{H} C_t - \frac{\zeta_0}{1 + \zeta} H_{t+1}^{1+\zeta} \right)^{-\gamma} \]

\[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} = \beta \frac{u_{c,t+1}}{u_{ct}} \]

C.3 Price Setting

Given \( p_{nnc, j,t-1}, k_{nnc, j,t-1}, S_{j,t-1}, \) and \( T_{j,t-1}, \) a representative intermediate good producer chooses \( \{h_{j,t+s}, m_{j,t+s}, p_{nnc, j,t+s}, y_{j,t+s}^{nc}, k_{nnc, j,t+s}, S_{j,t+s}, T_{j,t+s}\}, s \geq 0 \) to maximize

\[ \max \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+s} \left( p_{nnc, j,t+s} y_{j,t+s}^{nc} - w_{t+s} h_{j,t+s} - e_{t+s} m_{j,t+s} - \Theta_{t+s} \left( \frac{p_{nnc, j,t+s}}{p_{t,s+1}} \right) \right) \right] \right. \]

\[ + \left. q_{nnc}^{nc} \lambda_{nc} k_{nnc, j,t+s-1} - R_{nnc}^{s} S_{j,t+s-1} - R_{nnc}^{F} T_{j,t+s-1} \right] \]

subject to:

\[ 0 = y_{j,t}^{nc} - A_{t}^{nc} \left( \frac{k_{j,t-1}}{\alpha_k} \right) ^{\alpha_k} \left( \frac{m_{j,t}}{\alpha_m} \right) ^{\alpha_m} \left( \frac{h_{j,t}}{1 - \alpha_k - \alpha_m} \right) ^{1 - \alpha_k - \alpha_m} \]

\[ 0 = y_{j,t}^{nc} - \left( \frac{p_{nnc, j,t}}{p_{nnc, j,t}} \right) ^{-\eta} Y_{t}^{nc} \]
Denoting the Lagrangian multipliers: \( mc_t, L_{1t}, \) and \( L_{2t} \) respectively, and let define 

\[
0 = S_{j,t} + \mathcal{F}_{j,t} - q^{nc}_{t} k^{nc}_{j,t}
\]

The necessary conditions are:

\[
\begin{align*}
    h_{j,t} & : \quad 0 = -w_t + mc_t A_t^{nc} \left( k^{nc}_{j,t-1} \right)^{\alpha_k} \left( m_{j,t} \right)^{\alpha_m} h_{j,t}^{-\alpha_k - \alpha_m} \\
    m_{j,t} & : \quad 0 = -e_t + mc_t A_t^{nc} m_{j,t}^{\alpha_m - 1} \left( k^{nc}_{j,t-1} \right)^{\alpha_k} \left( h_{j,t} \right)^{-\alpha_k - \alpha_m} \\
    p^{nc}_{j,t} & : \quad 0 = \frac{1}{p^{nc}_{t}} y^{nc}_{j,t} - \frac{1}{p^{nc}_{t}} - \Theta' - L_{1t} \eta (p^{nc}_{j,t})^{-\eta - 1} \left( \frac{1}{p^{nc}_{t}} \right)^{-\eta} Y^{nc}_t + \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \right] p^{nc}_{j,t+1} \Theta'_{t+1} \\
    y^{nc}_{j,t} & : \quad 0 = p^{nc}_{j,t} - mc_t - L_{1t} \\
    k^{nc}_{j,t} & : \quad 0 = -L_{2t} q^{nc}_{j,t} + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ \lambda_{nc} q^{nc}_{j,t} + z_t \right] \\
    S_{j,t} & : \quad 0 = L_{2t} - \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^{S} \\
    \mathcal{F}_{j,t} & : \quad 0 = L_{2t} - \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^{F}
\end{align*}
\]

along with the three restrictions written above. We can rearrange and aggregate to get the following **optimal conditions**:

\[
\begin{align*}
    Y^{nc}_t & = A_t^{nc} \left( K^{nc}_{t-1} \right)^{\alpha_k} \left( M_t \right)^{\alpha_m} \left( H_t \right)^{-\alpha_k - \alpha_m} \\
    z_t & = \alpha_k mc_t K^{nc}_{t-1} Y^{nc}_t \\
    e_t & = \alpha_m mc_t Y^{nc}_t \\
    m_{ct} & = \frac{1}{A_t^{nc}} z_t^{\alpha_k} e_t^{\alpha_m} w_t^{-\alpha_k - \alpha_m} \\
    q^{nc}_t k^{nc}_t & = S_t + \mathcal{F}_t \\
    R^{nc}_t & = \frac{\lambda_{nc} q^{nc}_t + z_t}{q^{nc}_{t-1}} \\
    0 & = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( R^{nc}_{t+1} - R^{S}_{t+1} \right) \right] \\
    0 & = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( R^{nc}_{t+1} - R^{F}_{t+1} \right) \right]
\end{align*}
\]

Moreover, regarding the optimal pricing

\[
\frac{1}{p^{nc}_t} \left( \frac{p^{nc}_{j,t}}{p^{nc}_t} \right)^{-\eta} Y^{nc}_t - \frac{\eta}{p^{nc}_t} \left( \frac{p^{nc}_{j,t}}{p^{nc}_t} - mc_t \right) \left( \frac{p^{nc}_{j,t}}{p^{nc}_t} \right)^{-\eta} Y^{nc}_t
\]
Considering the symmetric equilibrium \( p_{jt}^{nc} = P_t^{nc} \) for all \( j \in [0,1] \) and denoting \( \pi_t = \frac{p_{nj}^{nc}}{\bar{p}_{jt}^{nc} - 1} \), then

\[
0 = \frac{1}{P_t^{nc}} Y_t^{nc} - \frac{\eta}{P_t^{nc}} (1 - mc_t) Y_t^{nc} - \frac{\kappa}{P_t^{nc}} \left( \frac{p_{nj}^{nc}}{P_t^{nc} - 1} \right) Y_t^{nc} + \kappa \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( \frac{p_{nj}^{nc} + 1}{P_t^{nc}} \right)^2 \frac{p_{nj}^{nc}}{P_t^{nc} - 1} \right] Y_{t+1}^{nc}.
\]

Hence, we obtain the Phillips Curve equation:

\[
(1 + \pi_t) \pi_t = \frac{1}{\kappa} (1 - \eta + \eta mc_t) + \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} (1 + \pi_{t+1}) \pi_{t+1} \frac{Y_{t+1}^{nc}}{Y_t^{nc}} \right]
\]  

(15)

Intermediate good producers also need to decide the optimal composition for \( F_t \). First note that:

\[
R_t^F F_{j,t-1} = R_t^l l_{j,t-1} + R_t^l e_t l_{j,t-1}^*
\]

(16)

Then, the composition problem is:

\[
\min_{l_{j,t}, l_{j,t}^*} \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^F F_{j,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_t^l l_{j,t} + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} e_t l_{j,t}^* l_{j,t}^*
\]

subject to:

\[
F(l_{j,t}, e_t l_{j,t}^*) \leq F_{j,t}
\]

Let \( L_3 \) be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the restriction, then the optimal conditions are:

\[
0 = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^l - L_3 F_1(l_{j,t}, e_t l_{j,t}^*)
\]

\[
0 = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} e_t l_{j,t}^* R_{t+1}^l - L_3 F_2(l_{j,t}, e_t l_{j,t}^*)
\]

Since we assume that \( F() \) is an homogeneous function, then \( L_3 = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^F \) or equivalently

\[
F_1(l_{j,t}, e_t l_{j,t}^*) = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^l}{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^F}
\]

\[
F_2(l_{j,t}, e_t l_{j,t}^*) = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} e_t l_{j,t}^* R_{t+1}^l}{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^F}
\]
In our baseline parametrization we use the next CES function

\[ \mathcal{F}(l, e_l^*) = A^e L_t^{1-\delta_f} (e_t L_t^*)^{\delta_f} \]  

(17)

Hence,

\[ l_{j,t} = (1 - \delta_f) \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_t R_t^F}{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_t R_t^F} \right) F_{j,t} \]  

(18)

\[ e_t l_{j,t}^* = \delta_f \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_t R_t^F}{\mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_t R_t^F} \right) F_{j,t} \]  

(19)

We finally impose that \( S_t \) is equity so that \( R_t^S = R_t^{knc} \).