

# Aiming for the bull's eye: Uncertainty and inertia in monetary policy

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## What the paper does

- Demertzis and Viegli (DV) derive a policy procedure in a forward looking New-Keynesian type model
- 2 twists:
  - Parameter uncertainty: The slope of the short run Phillips curve is unknown
  - Expectations are subject to differential information as in Morris and Shin (2006) which introduces inflation inertia

## The set up

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \alpha y_t + \varepsilon_t$$

$$y_t = E_t y_{t+1} - \gamma (i_t - \beta E_t \pi_{t+1}) + \xi_t$$

$$\alpha \sim N(\bar{\alpha}, \sigma_\alpha^2)$$

$$L = [(\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 + y_t^2]$$

Brainard's (1967) result applies: Policy "caution" is increasing in variance of  $\alpha$

# Expectations

DV appeal to Morris and Shin (2006)

- Only a fraction  $\mu$  of price setters receive information about the CB's target level of inflation  $\pi_t^*$
- This is used to motivate  $E_t \pi_{t+1} = \pi_{t-1}$  in numerical simulations

## The results

DV derive a two-step procedure that yields certainty equivalent policy recommendation

- More aggressive/certainty equivalent policy results in smaller losses than Brainard type policy
- What's going on?

## New Dynamics

$$\pi_t = \beta\pi_{t-1} + \alpha y_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (1)$$

- We are in Soderstrom (SJE 2002): Discretionary policy is now a dynamic problem
- No analytical solution to optimal policy if CB care about both inflation and output gap volatility
- No particular reason to believe that either Brainard or TS will be optimal
- Soderstrom finds that if inflation follows (1), then the intuition of Brainard still holds.

## Using Morris and Shin (2006) in a NK setting

Morris and Shin's set up is highly stylized:

$$\begin{aligned} a_{it} &= \gamma E_{it} \theta_t + \beta E_{it} a_{t+1} \\ a_t &= (1 - \beta) \bar{E}_t \theta_t + \bar{E}_t \beta a_{t+1} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

- Limit case for  $\beta \rightarrow 1$  perhaps not the most interesting or realistic
- State only affect outcomes through expectations
  - Otherwise a simple observation of  $a_t$  would reveal that the state has changed
- NK Phillips curve does not have the form (2)

## Suggestions

- Be more careful when transplanting Morris and Shin type information set up into the model
- Start from the price setting problem of the firm, define information sets and a process for CB's inflation target
- Solve the dynamic optimization problem of the central bank
- Interesting interactions between caution and learning about target?