Attitude of informal workers towards formality in Peru

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XXXVI Encuentro de Economistas del BCRP

October, 2018

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


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Introduction Motivation: Peru has one of the highest levels of informality in the world



Note: As percentage of GDP. Source: Medina and Schneider (2018).

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Introduction What do we do?

Research question: Why informal workers believe "it is not necessary" to be formal?

- Recent survey data provides information on the reasons for being informal in Peru.
- We explore potential factors that lead informal workers to believe that it is not necessary to be formal in Peru.
- **Hypothesis**: informality is related to several socio-economic and demographic characteristics.

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- Data: National Household Survey (ENAHO), 2014-2016.
- Empirical methodology: based on standard binary choice models:
 - linear probability, logit and probit models.
 - Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition.
- **Results**: income, age, type of worker, location of business and gender, among the main factors. Men are less committed to formality.

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- Peru: Loayza (2008), Chong y Otros (2008), Del Valle (2009), Jaramillo (2013), Díaz (2014), Herrera e Hidalgo (2014), Machado (2014), Tello (2014), Chacaltana (2016).
- **Empirical methods**: There is no single empirical approach for identifying the predictors of informality.
- **Studies**: Norris et al. (2008), Lehmann and Zaiceva (2013), Dau and Cuervo (2014), Thanh Thai and Ekaterina (2014), Babbitt et al. (2015), Williams et al. (2015), Elbahnasawy et al. (2016), etc.

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Introduction Literature Review: Key determinants/predictors of informality.

Author(s)	Entrepreneur's de- mographic and so- cioeconomic	Industry and Firms characteristics	Financial market development	Tax and Regulation burden	Quality of Institu- tions and Govern- ment Effectiveness
Macro Level					
Dau and Cuervo (2014)			×		×
Thanh Thai and Ekaterina (2014)				×	×
Elbahnasawy et al. (2016)				×	×
Moreno and Posadab (2018)					×
Firm Level					
Norris et al. (2008)		×	×	×	×
Williams et al. (2015)	×	×		×	×
Jimenez et al. (2015)	×				
Individual Level					
Babbitt et al. (2015)	×	×			
Lehmann and Zaiceva (2013)	×	×	×		

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Introduction Literature Review: by type of data

	Macro Level	Firm Level	Individual Level
	Dau and Cuervo (2014)	Norris et al. (2008)	Babbitt et al. (2015)
Research Question	Do pro-market institutions determine informal or formal entrepreneurships?	What causes firms to hide output?	Are female entrepreneurs more likely to prefer the formal sector or the informal sector?
Informality - measure	Informal entrepreneurship: Number of new unregistered businesses as a percent of the working-age population.	 The share of sales kept informal: what per- centage of total sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of activity keeps åÅIJoff the booksåÅI? 	 Based on the question: åÅIJDo you want to formalize your business?åÅI
		 7 answers: i) none at all, ii) 1-10%; iii) 11-20%; iv) 21-30%; v) 31-40%; vi) 41-50%; and vii) more than 50%. 	 55% of female entrepreneurs responded àÄlJyesäÄl and 48% of male entrepreneurs re- sponded àÄlJyes.àÄl
Data and sample	51 countries, period: 2002-2009.	4000 firms in 41 countries.	Indonesia, 141 entrepreneurs individuals (85 female and 56 male), period: 2012.
Determinants	Pro market institutions: Economic Liberaliza- tion and National Governance.	Index of quality of legal institutions, tax and reg- ulation burden, financial market development, entrepreneurial characteristics.	Socio-demographic and Industry-Firms charac- teristics.
Control Variables	GDP per capita, GDP growth, immigration rate, dummy of crises, unobserved country-specific factors.	GDP per capita.	
Methodology	Panel Data.	Ordered Probit Model.	Logistic Regression Model.
Main findings	 Institutional environment matters: start an en- trepreneurial venture and whether be informal or formal. 	Quality of legal institutions is important in de- termining the size of the informal sector.	Female entrepreneurs are less likely to be in- formal.
	Economic liberalization may facilitate their growth within the informal sector.	Taxes, regulations, and financial constraints are not significative.	Their decision is conditional on other factors.

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Introduction Literature Review: Gender Differences

> The literature provides several studies that explore the *impor*tance of gender in determining people preferences about informality, although no consensus appears to be reached.

- Sethuraman (1998), Chen et al (2006), Chant and Pedwell (2008), Chakrabarti (2009) and Otobe (2017): given the different structural disadvantages between men and women, women are more likely to be informal than men.
- Peru: are women more likely to prefer the formal rather than the informal sector?

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Data and summary statistics Source: Peruvian National Household Survey (ENAHO)

- Annual survey; national, urban, and rural coverage.
- Information on poverty, living conditions, household expenses and income, etc.
- Questionnaire ENAHO.04: "Income of the independent worker".
 - Question: "What is the main reason why you have not registered in SUNAT?" (applied for the first time in 2014).

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• Period of analysis: 2014 – 2016.

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Data and summary statistics

ENAHO: "What is the main reason why you have not registered in SUNAT?"

		Mai	n Occupa	tion
	Answers	2014	2015	2016
1	The procedures are very complicated	0.85%	0.63%	1.09%
2	I do not know if I must register	3.32%	1.62%	1.65%
3	I do not know where or how to register	1.03%	0.79%	0.87%
4	I could not assume the tax burden if I were registered	2.90%	3.34%	2.46%
5	It is time consuming	0.89%	0.74%	0.52%
6	My business is small / I produce small quantities	41.44%	37.85%	37.34%
7	It is an eventual work	9.62%	8.41%	8.26%
8	I do not believe it is necessary	38.71%	46.0%	46.74%
9	Another	1.23%	0.82%	1.10%
	TOTAL in %	100%	100%	100%
	TOTAL	12 395	12 057	13 919
	Grouped answers		2014-2016	6
	the sector sector (section 0)		40.00	
1	It is not necessary (option 8)		43.93	
0	Other reasons (all except option 8)		56.07	
	TOTAL		38 371	


Employer and Independent worker

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Data source Distribution of all answers 2014-2016



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Conclusions

Data and summary statistics Distribution of two most important answers

Why aren't you registered in the tax administation? Distribution of responses (percentage) 8 487 46.0 43.9 41.8 4 8 Percentage 8 17.1 0 Other mall Scale Other Other all Scale Other Small Scale necessary essary Small Scale necessary necessarv 4ot -top 2014 2015 2016 Total Source: ENAHO

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Conclusions

Data and summary statistics Distribution of answers by gender



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main facts

- The evidence suggests that most informal workers do not consider it necessary to become formal.
- Informal workers who are less committed to pay taxes are men, between 36 and 55 years, without education or basic school education, partners or married, whose business location is in Lima and whose economic activity belongs to the transports and retail sales sector.

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 In order to identify the factors that determine the attitude of informal workers towards formality, we define our endogenous variable y_i as follows:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & , & "i" \text{ believes it is not necessary to be formal} \\ & (i.e., \text{ tax compliant}) \\ 0 & , & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where "i" represents an individual that is informal. In order to estimate the probability that $y_i = 1$ conditional on a $k \times 1$ vector of explanatory variables x_i



First we assume that this probability is a linear function of x_i :

$$y_i = Pr(y_i = 1 | x_i) + u_i$$
$$= x'_i \beta + u_i$$

for i = 1, 2, ..., n, where β is a $k \times 1$ vector of unknown parameters and $E(u_i) = 0$. The vector x_i includes factors that describe informal worker *i*, such as age, gender, educational attainment, income, among others.

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In order to avoid any potential biases, we also estimate two standard discrete choice models. First, we estimate a probit model, which assumes that the probability of y_i is described by:

$$Prob[y_i = 1] = \Phi(x'_i\beta)$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ represents a standard normal distribution. Second, we estimated a logit model, which assumes that the probability of y_i is described by :

$$\mathsf{Prob}[y_i = 1] = rac{\exp(x'_ieta)}{1 + \exp(x'_ieta)}$$

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The implementation of OB requires the estimation of separate regressions for males and females:

$$y_{m,i} = x'_{m,i}\beta_m + u_{m,i}$$

 $y_{f,i} = x'_{f,i}\beta_f + u_{f,i}$

The OD is an expression that compares the expected value of y_i between males and females:

$$E[y_{m,i}] - E[y_{f,i}] = x'_{m,i}\beta_m - x'_{f,i}\beta_f$$

= $[x_{m,i} - x_{f,i}]'\beta_f + x'_{m,i}[\beta_m - \beta_f]$

Introduction Data and Summary Statistics Empirical methodology Results Conclusions Methodology Oaxaca/Blinder (OB) decomposition

The differences in the attitude towards formality can be explained by two components:

- Differences in observed characteristics specified in x, $[x_{m,i} x_{f,i}]$, usually called the explained component.
- 2 Differences related to being male and female (treatment effect), $[\beta_m \beta_f]$.

The Oaxaca decomposition can be estimated using the OLS estimates of β_m and β_f and the sample mean values of $x_{m,i}$ and $x_{f,i}$:

$$\bar{\mathbf{y}}_m - \bar{\mathbf{y}}_f = \left[\bar{\mathbf{x}}_m - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_f\right]' \hat{\beta}_f + \bar{\mathbf{x}}_m [\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f]$$

Conclusions

Methodology Explanatory variables

income The natural log of the annual income in the main activity of informal worker. enerale A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is legal 18–25 years; = 0 otherwise. age08_55 A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is aged 26–35 years; = 0 otherwise. age08_55 A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is aged 36–55 years; = 0 otherwise. A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is aged 36–55 years; = 0 otherwise. A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is aged 36–55 years; = 0 otherwise. age08_55 A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is aged 36–55 years; = 0 otherwise. age08_55 A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is aged 36–55 years; = 0 otherwise. age08_56 A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is married or partner; = 0 otherwise. A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is divorced or separated; = 0 otherwise. A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is independent; ad ummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is independent; = 0 otherwise.
age18_25 A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is aged 18-25 years;
aga62_35 A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is aged 26-35 years; o therwise. o therwise. a 0 otherwise.
aga36_55 A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is aged 36-55 years; = 0 otherwise. add otherwise. - 0 otherwise. add ummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is divorced or separated; 2015 - 0 otherwise. ad ummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is divorced or separated; 2015 - 0 otherwise. ad ourmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is divorced or separated; 2015 - 0 otherwise. a dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is divorced or separated; 2015 - 0 otherwise. a dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is independent;
with_edu A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker has a level of education higher than pre-exhcel (primary, secondary, university, postgraduate, or other high education, either complete or incomplete; = 0 otherwise. marrpart A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is married or partner; = 0 otherwise. a durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is divorced or separated; = 0 otherwise. 2015 A durmy variable = 1 if the informal worker is divorced or separated; = 0 otherwise. 2015 A durmy variable = 1 if the jard is 2015; = 0 otherwise. 2016 A durmy variable = 1 if the jard is 2016; = 0 otherwise. 2016 A durmy variable = 1 if the jard is 2016; = 0 otherwise. A durmy variable = 1 if the jard is 2016; = 0 otherwise.
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either complete or incomplete; = 0 otherwise marrpart A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is married or partner; = 0 otherwise. = 0 otherwise. 2015 A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is divorced or separated; = 0 otherwise. 2016 A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is 0:016; = 0 otherwise. 2016 A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is independent; = 0 otherwise.
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= 0 otherwise. 12016 A dummy variable = 1 if the year is 2016; o otherwise. ndependent A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is independent;
12016 A dummy variable = 1 if the year is 2016; = 0 otherwise. ndependent A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is independent;
= 0 otherwise. ndependent A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is independent;
ndependent A dummy variable = 1 if the informal worker is independent;
= 0 otherwise
secondary_act A dummy variable = 1 if the economic activity of informal worker belongs
to secondary sector;
= 0 otherwise.
erciary_act A dummy variable = 1 if the economic activity of informal worker belongs
to terciary sector;
= 0 otherwise.
department A dummy variable = 1 for each department of Peru indicating the location
of the business of informal worker. There are in total 24 region dummies;
= 0 otherwise.

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Summary statistics by gender group

Variable	Pooled	Female	Male
	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD
not necessary	0.43930	0.36638	0.53607
	(0.4963)	(0.4818)	(0.4987)
lincome	9.16290	8.84016	9.59119
	(1.3096)	(1.3940)	(1.0445)
female	0.57026	1	
	(0.4950)	0	
age18_25	0.10139	0.07403	0.13770
	(0.3018)	(0.2618)	(0.3445)
age26_35	0.18919	0.18307	0.19731
	(0.3916)	(0.3867)	(0.3979)
age36_55	0.46774	0.49794	0.42765
	(0.4989)	(0.5001)	(0.4947)
with_edu	0.94618	0.91580	0.98651
	(0.2256)	(0.2776)	(0.1154)
marrpart	0.66627	0.66564	0.66710
	(0.4715)	(0.4718)	(0.4713)
widivse	0.18619	0.23858	0.11666
	(0.3893)	(0.4262)	(0.3210)
d2015	0.31470	0.31393	0.31573
	(0.4645)	(0.4641)	(0.4649)
d2016	0.36360	0.36384	0.36329
	(0.4810)	(0.4811)	(0.4809)
independent	0.94927	0.97304	0.91772
	(0.2194)	(0.1619)	(0.2748)
secondary_act	0.11451	0.13725	0.08433
	(0.3184)	(0.3441)	(0.2778)
terciary_act	0.84945	0.85751	0.83876
	(0.3576)	(0.3495)	(0.3677)
Observations	37 279	21 259	16 020

Standard Deviation in parentheses.

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Marginal and Impact effects Estimates from the linear probability model

Dependent variable: not necessary									
	Model 1:	2014-2016	Model	Model 2: 2014		Model 3: 2015		Model 4: 2016	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err	
lincome	0.015***	(0.002)	0.014***	(0.004)	0.017***	(0.004)	0.014***	(0.004)	
female	-0.144***	(0.005)	-0.153***	(0.010)	-0.142***	(0.010)	-0.135***	(0.009)	
age18_25	0.023**	(0.010)	0.043**	(0.018)	0.021	(0.018)	0.007	(0.018)	
age26_35	0.030***	(0.008)	0.047***	(0.014)	0.028**	(0.014)	0.019	(0.013)	
age36_55	0.027***	(0.006)	0.026**	(0.011)	0.040***	(0.011)	0.020*	(0.011)	
with_edu	-0.014	(0.011)	-0.020	(0.020)	-0.002	(0.020)	-0.022	(0.019)	
marrpart	-0.009	(0.008)	-0.008	(0.014)	-0.010	(0.014)	-0.012	(0.013)	
widivse	0.002	(0.010)	0.007	(0.017)	-0.007	(0.017)	-0.000	(0.016)	
d2015	0.073***	(0.006)							
d2016	0.081***	(0.006)							
independent	0.063***	(0.012)	0.086***	(0.019)	0.051**	(0.021)	0.050**	(0.020)	
secondary_act	-0.018	(0.015)	0.037	(0.027)	-0.039	(0.027)	-0.043*	(0.026)	
terciary_act	0.020	(0.014)	0.079***	(0.024)	-0.013	(0.024)	-0.001	(0.023)	
constant	0.339***	(0.033)	0.346***	(0.055)	0.457***	(0.059)	0.405***	(0.057)	
R-squared	0.100		0.101		0.120		0.099		
Observations	37095		11975		11710		13410		
F stat regression	111		38		46		42		
P val F regression	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Marginal and Impact effects 2014-2016 LPM, Probit and logit

Dependent variable: not_necessary								
	LF	PM	PRC	DBIT	LO	LOGIT		
	dy/dx	Std. Err.	dy/dx	Std. Err.	dy/dx	Std. Err.		
	0.015***	(0,000)	0.045***	(0.000)	0.010***	(0.000)		
lincome		(0.002)	0.015***	(0.002)	0.016***	(0.002)		
female	-0.144***	(0.005)	-0.143***	(0.006)	-0.142***	(0.006)		
age18_25	0.023**	(0.010)	0.023**	(0.010)	0.023**	(0.010)		
age26_35	0.030***	(0.008)	0.030***	(0.008)	0.029***	(0.008)		
age36_55	0.027***	(0.006)	0.027***	(0.006)	0.026***	(0.006)		
secondary_act	-0.018	(0.015)	-0.020	(0.015)	-0.022	(0.015)		
tertiary_act	0.020	(0.014)	0.020	(0.013)	0.020	(0.013)		
with_edu	-0.014	(0.011)	-0.012	(0.012)	-0.012	(0.012)		
marrpart	-0.009	(0.008)	-0.009	(0.008)	-0.009	(0.008)		
widivse	0.002	(0.010)	0.002	(0.010)	0.002	(0.010)		
d2015	0.073***	(0.006)	0.073***	(0.006)	0.073***	(0.006)		
d2016	0.081***	(0.006)	0.082***	(0.006)	0.081***	(0.006)		
independent	0.063***	(0.012)	0.061***	(0.011)	0.061***	(0.011)		

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Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results

Conclusions

Oaxaca/Blinder (OB) decomposition

	Dependent variable: not_necessary									
	Model 1: 2014-2016 Model 2: 2014 Model 3: 2015 Model									
total										
female	0.367***	0.313***	0.383***	0.400***						
	(110.57)	(55.68)	(64.20)	(71.29)						
male	0.536***	0.486***	0.561***	0.558***						
	(135.49)	(69.48)	(80.10)	(84.97)						
difference	-0.169***	-0.173***	-0.178***	-0.158***						
	(-32.77)	(-19.28)	(-19.35)	(-18.26)						
explained	-0.0250***	-0.0233**	-0.0356***	-0.0206**						
	(-5.63)	(-2.97)	(-4.57)	(-2.73)						
unexplained	-0.144***	-0.150***	-0.143***	-0.137***						
	(-22.04)	(-13.02)	(-12.47)	(-12.49)						

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Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results

Conclusions

Log Income regressions


Dependent variable: not_necessary									
	Model 1:	2014-2016	Model	Model 2: 2014		Model 3: 2015		Model 4: 2016	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. En	
female	-0.664***	(0.013)	-0.702***	(0.023)	-0.662***	(0.023)	-0.631***	(0.021)	
age18_25	-0.052**	(0.025)	-0.057	(0.044)	-0.042	(0.043)	-0.055	(0.041)	
age26_35	0.289***	(0.019)	0.301***	(0.034)	0.296***	(0.033)	0.270***	(0.031)	
age36_55	0.353***	(0.015)	0.356***	(0.027)	0.350***	(0.027)	0.353***	(0.025)	
with edu	0.482***	(0.027)	0.521***	(0.049)	0.477***	(0.048)	0.447***	(0.045)	
marrpart	0.334***	(0.019)	0.370***	(0.034)	0.317***	(0.034)	0.312***	(0.031)	
widivse	0.336***	(0.023)	0.322***	(0.041)	0.313***	(0.041)	0.356***	(0.037)	
d2015	0.057***	(0.015)							
d2016	0.077***	(0.014)							
independent	-1.157***	(0.027)	-1.158***	(0.047)	-1.134***	(0.049)	-1.174***	(0.045)	
secondary_act	-0.428***	(0.037)	-0.445***	(0.067)	-0.359***	(0.066)	-0.479***	(0.060)	
tertiary_act	0.457***	(0.033)	0.439***	(0.059)	0.510***	(0.058)	0.418***	(0.053)	
constant	9.472***	(0.062)	9.388***	(0.108)	9.508***	(0.110)	9.666***	(0.102)	
R-square	0.257		0.260		0.258		0.262		
Observations	37095		11975		11710		13410		
F stat regression	357		123		119		140		
P val F regression	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

3





- 2 Data and Summary Statistics
- 3 Empirical methodology

4 Results



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- The results suggest that variables such as gender, income, age, type of worker and location of the business, help explaining why informal workers believe it is not necessary to become formal.
- Evidence of gender differences: informal women have a more positive attitude towards formality than men.
- These results are robust to the sample period and alternative estimation methods.

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Thanks

Erick Lahura and María Paula Vargas Informality in Peru

Attitude of informal workers towards formality in Peru

Erick Lahura and María Paula Vargas

XXXVI Encuentro de Economistas del BCRP

October, 2018

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