

# Firing Costs and Labor Market Fluctuations: A Cross-Country Analysis

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## What do we do?: Study aggregate hours in the business cycle

- **Data:** Business cycle volatility of total hours worked widely differ across countries.
- **Theory:** Heterogeneous firm model with extensive and intensive margins of labor and fixed labor adjustment costs (i.e. firing costs).

## What do we find?

- Differences in firing costs can account for the cross-country variation of the business cycle volatility of total hours worked.
- Abstracting from the intensive margin has important quantitative implications for the effect of firing costs.
  - With the intensive margin, small firing costs have greater effect on the extensive margin fluctuations.

# Agenda

- 1 Empirical evidence.
- 2 Model with overtime.
- 3 Quantitative analysis.
  - Calibration.
  - Results.
  - Extensions.
- 4 Final remarks.

# Stylized facts

Cross-country patterns of labor market fluctuations:

- 1 Business cycle volatility of total hours worked widely differ across countries.
- 2 Countries that adjust more via the extensive margin tend to show more volatile total hours worked.

Figure: Volatility of Total Hours Worked vs. Relative volatility Intensive/Extensive Margins





Figure: EPL vs. Relative volatility Intensive/Extensive Margins



# Model - Household (1)

- Indivisible labor framework (Hansen and Sargent, 1988).
  - There one family composed by population of individuals (normalized = 1).
  - Individuals choose  $\{0, h_1, h_1 + h_2\}$  hours (convexification via lotteries).
  - Family chooses: consumption  $C$ , employment levels  $N_{1,2}$ , next period capital  $K'$ .
  - Employment is  $N_1$ , from which  $N_2$  works  $h_1 + h_2$  and the rest works  $h_1$  hours.
  
- Preferences:

$$\log C(s) - \chi \underbrace{(N_1(s) - N_2(s))}_{\text{only } h_1 \text{ hours}} \frac{h_1^{1+\zeta}}{1+\zeta} - \chi \underbrace{N_2(s)}_{h_1+h_2} \frac{(h_1 + h_2)^{1+\zeta}}{1+\zeta}$$



# Model - Firms (1)

- Fixed population  $j \in [0, 1]$ .
- Decreasing returns to scale technology:

$$y_{jt} = \underbrace{e^{z_t} e^{\varepsilon_{jt}} k_{jt}^\alpha n_{1jt}^{1-\nu} h_1}_{\text{First stage}} + \underbrace{e^{z_t} e^{\varepsilon_{jt}} k_{jt}^\alpha n_{2jt}^{1-\nu} h_2}_{\text{Second stage}}, \quad \alpha + \nu < 1$$

- Where:
  - Idiosyncratic productivity  $\varepsilon_t \in \{\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_{n_\varepsilon}\} \sim$  i.i.d. Markov.
  - Aggregate productivity  $z_{t+1} = \rho_z z_t + \sigma_z \omega_{t+1}^z$ , where  $\omega_{t+1}^z \sim N(0, 1)$ .
  - Rented capital  $k_{jt}$ , stage-1 employment  $n'_{1jt}$ , and stage-2 employment  $n'_{2jt}$ .
  - Important:  $n'_{2jt} \in n'_{1jt} \implies n'_{2jt}$  workers work  $h_1 + h_2$  hours.

## Model - Firms (2)

- $\hat{v}(\varepsilon, n_1; s)$  is the firm  $(\varepsilon, n_1)$  value function.
- Firm enters the period with  $n_1$  employment and a fraction  $q \in (0, 1)$  quits.
- The problem of the firm:

$$\hat{v}(\varepsilon, n_1; s) = \max_{k, n'_1, n'_2} \lambda(s) \left[ \begin{array}{l} e^z e^\varepsilon k^\alpha (n_1'^V h_1 + n_2'^V h_2) - r(s) k - w_1(s) n'_1 - w_2(s) n'_2 \\ -\tau_h \max(0, n'_1 - (1-q)n_1) \\ -\tau_f \max(0, (1-q)n_1 - n'_1) \end{array} \right] \\ + \beta E [\hat{v}(\varepsilon', n'_1; s') | \varepsilon, n_1; s]$$


## Model - Firms (3)

- Problem of the firm:

$$\hat{v}(\varepsilon, n_1; s) = \max_{k, n'_1, n'_2} \lambda(s) \left[ \begin{array}{l} e^z e^\varepsilon k^\alpha (n'_1{}^{\nu} h_1 + n'_2{}^{\nu} h_2) - r(s) k - w_1(s) n'_1 - w_2(s) n'_2 \\ -\tau_h \max(0, n'_1 - (1-q)n_1) \\ -\tau_f \max(0, (1-q)n_1 - n'_1) \end{array} \right] \\ + \beta E [\hat{v}(\varepsilon', n'_1; s') | \varepsilon, n_1; s]$$

- Policy function  $n'_1(\varepsilon, n_1; s)$  takes the form of (S,s) band.

## Model overtime - Ss bands

Figure: Policy functions  $n_1'(\varepsilon, n_1; s)$ 

# Model - Market clearing and firm size distribution

- Market clearing:

$$\int n'_1(\varepsilon, n_1; s) d\mu(\varepsilon, n_1) = N_1(s)$$

$$\int n'_2(\varepsilon, n_1; s) d\mu(\varepsilon, n_1) = N_2(s)$$

$$\int k(\varepsilon, n_1; s) d\mu(\varepsilon, n_1) = K$$

$$\int y(\varepsilon, n_1; s) d\mu(\varepsilon, n_1) = C(s) + K'(s) - (1 - \delta)K$$

- Take a set  $\Delta_{n'_1}$ , the law of motion of  $\mu'(z, \mu)$  is

$$\mu'(z, \mu) \left( \varepsilon' \times \Delta_{n'_1} \right) = \sum_{\varepsilon} \pi(\varepsilon' | \varepsilon) \int \mathbb{I} \left( n'_1(\varepsilon, n_1; s) \in \Delta_{n'_1} \right) d\mu(\varepsilon, n_1)$$

## Calibration (1)

- Most parameters take the standard values.

	Parameter	Value	Note
Discount factor	$\beta$	0.99	
Depreciation rate	$\delta$	0.025	
Curvature in technology (labor)	$\nu$	0.64	Khan and Thomas (2008)
Curvature in technology (capital)	$\alpha$	0.256	Khan and Thomas (2008)
Firing costs	$\tau_f$	0.07	Percent of full-time wage Bloom (2009)
Hiring cost	$\tau_h$	0.07	Percent of full-time wage Bloom (2009)
Persistence of aggregate productivity	$\rho_z$	0.95	
Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity	$\rho_\epsilon$	0.75	Cooper et al. (2015)

## Calibration (2)

- These parameters are chosen to match US moments.
- Straight-time and overtime interpretation (Hansen and Sargent, 1988).

	Parameter	Value	Target
Quit rate	$q$	0.06	6% average quarterly quit rate
Curvature in utility	$\zeta$	0.50	50% overtime wage premium
Scaling in utility	$\chi$	9.55	0.6 employment to population ratio.
Stage-1 hours	$h_1$	0.46	Full-time hours.
Stage-2 hours	$h_2$	0.13	Over-time hours.
Volatility of idiosyncratic productivity	$\sigma_\epsilon$	0.07	5% average job destruction rate.
Volatility of aggregate productivity	$\sigma_z$	0.007	1.5% standard deviation of HP GDP.

## Steady state effects - overtime

- Substitution of extensive and intensive margins is limited given a permanent changes in firing costs.
- Major impact in terms of job flows.

Table: Steady state effects (overtime)

Hiring cost $\tau_h$	$0.0w_1$	$0.07w_1$	$0.07w_1$	$0.07w_1$
Firing cost $\tau_f$	$0.0w_1$	$0.07w_1$	$0.5w_1$	$w_1$
Output	103.61	100.00	97.04	95.90
Employment	104.99	100.00	95.80	94.15
Hours per worker	99.19	100.00	100.79	101.13
Total hours	104.14	100.00	96.55	95.21
Job destruction rate	11.47	4.92	3.27	2.68




## Business cycle effects - overtime


Table: Business Cycle Effects

Hiring cost $\tau_h$	$0.0w_1$	$0.07w_1$	$0.07w_1$	$0.07w_1$
Firing cost $\tau_f$	$0.0w_1$	$0.07w_1$	$0.5w_1$	$w_1$
<b>A. Standard deviation</b>				
Output	1.62	1.51	1.37	1.37
<b>B. Relative volatility</b>				
Consumption	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.37
Investment	4.07	4.01	3.97	3.98
Employment	0.70	0.63	0.52	0.50
Hours per worker	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.04
Total hours	0.70	0.64	0.55	0.54

## Business Cycles



## Business Cycles



## Business cycle effects - overtime

Table: Intensive vs. extensive margin (overtime)

Hiring cost $\tau_h$	$0.0w_1$	$0.07w_1$	$0.07w_1$	$0.07w_1$
Firing cost $\tau_f$	$0.0w_1$	$0.07w_1$	$0.5w_1$	$w_1$
<b>Extensive margin only</b>				
Employment	0.71	0.70	0.63	0.59
<b>Extensive and intensive</b>				
Employment	0.70	0.63	0.52	0.50
Hours per worker	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.04
Total hours	0.70	0.64	0.55	0.54

- The intensive margin matters for the labor fluctuations along the business cycle.

# Final remarks

- **Data:** We document the following facts:
  - Business cycle volatility of total hours worked widely differ across countries.
  - Countries that adjust more via the extensive margin tend to show more volatile total hours worked.
- **Theory:** Heterogeneous firm model with extensive and intensive margins of labor and fixed firing costs.
- **Results:** Firing costs quantitatively account for the cross-country variation of the business cycle volatility of total hours worked.
  - Substitution between extensive and intensive margins of labor.
- Working progress: adding part-time employment.

## Extension - 3 types of labor

- Preferences

$$\frac{C(s)^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} - \chi_f (N_f(s) - N_o(s)) h_f - \chi_o N_o(s) (h_f + h_o) - \chi_p N_p(s) h_p$$

- Full-time employment includes overtime.
- Part-time employment is a different type of labor.

- Technology:

$$y = e^z e^\varepsilon k^\alpha (n_f^v h_f + A_o n_o^v h_o + A_p n_p^v h_p)$$

- Only  $n_f$  faces hiring and firing costs.

Thanks

# Calibration - details

- 2% Average monthly quit rate from BLS's JOLTS.
- 50% overtime wage premium, see Hart (2004) - US Fair Labor Standards Act
- $h_1 = 0.46$  straight-time hours is consistent with an average of 40 weekly hours per worker and 3 weekly overtime hours per worker, see Hansen and Sargent (1988).
- $h_2 = 0.13$  over-time hours from Hansen and Sargent (1988).
- 5% average job destruction rate from US Census Bureau BDS.



# Model - Family

## ■ Resources:

- 1 Rents the initial level of capital  $K$  at the rate  $r(s)$ .
- 2 Supplies labor  $N_1(s)$  and  $N_2(s)$  at the wage rates  $w_1(s)$  and  $w_2(s)$ .
- 3 Receives transfers from firms  $\int \pi(\varepsilon, n_1; s) d\mu(\varepsilon, n_1; s)$  and a lump-sum transfer  $T(s)$ .

## ■ Uses:

- 1 Consumes  $C(s)$ .
- 2 Invest in new capital  $K'(s) - (1 - \delta)K$

## Model - Family

- From the family problem:

$$N_1(s) : \chi \frac{h_1^{1+\zeta}}{1+\chi} = \lambda(s) w_1(s)$$

$$N_2(s) : \chi \frac{(h_1 + h_2)^{1+\zeta}}{1+\zeta} - \chi \frac{h_1^{1+\zeta}}{1+\zeta} = \lambda(s) w_2(s)$$

- Which implies a constant *premium*:

$$\frac{w_2(s) / h_2}{w_1(s) / h_1} = \frac{h_1}{h_2} \left[ \left( \frac{h_1 + h_2}{h_1} \right)^{1+\zeta} - 1 \right] > 1$$

## Model overtime - Firms

- Problem of the firm:

$$\hat{v}(\varepsilon, n_1; s) = \max_{k, n'_1, n'_2} \lambda(s) \left[ \begin{array}{l} e^z e^\varepsilon k^\alpha (n_1'^v h_1 + n_2'^v h_2) - r(s) k - w_1(s) n'_1 - w_2(s) n'_2 \\ -\tau_h \max(0, n'_1 - (1-q)n_1) \\ -\tau_f \max(0, (1-q)n_1 - n'_1) \end{array} \right] \\ + \beta E [\hat{v}(\varepsilon', n'_1; s') | \varepsilon, n_1; s]$$

- First order conditions of  $k$  &  $n'_2$  are static.
  - Marginal product = factor price.
  - Marginal products are equalized across firms.

## Model overtime - Firms

- Hiring:  $n'_1 > (1 - q)n_1$  FOC is:


$$\lambda(s) \left[ v \frac{e^z e^\varepsilon k^\alpha n_1^{\nu} h_1}{n'_1} - w_1(s) - \tau_h \right] + \beta E \left[ \frac{\hat{v}(\varepsilon', n'_1; s')}{\partial n'_1} \mid \varepsilon, n_1; s \right] = 0$$

- Firing  $n'_1 < (1 - q)n_1$  FOC is:

$$\lambda(s) \left[ v \frac{e^z e^\varepsilon k^\alpha n_1^{\nu} h_1}{n'_1} - w_1(s) + \tau_f \right] + \beta E \left[ \frac{\hat{v}(\varepsilon', n'_1; s')}{\partial n'_1} \mid \varepsilon, n_1; s \right] = 0$$

- Inaction :  $n'_1 = (1 - q)n_1$  .

**Figure:** Part-time employment share (35 hours/week or less), Source: Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2019). Blue line (working-age population), green dotted line (prime-age population)



# Model - Solution method

- The aggregate state is  $s \equiv (z, K, \mu)$
- The solution is computed using Boppart et al. (2018) method.
  - Deterministic transition path given a transitory productivity shock  $\{z_t\}_{t=0}^T$ .
  - Steady state  $t = 0 \rightarrow$  steady state  $t = T$ .
  - Guess a sequence for the interest rate  $\{\hat{r}_t\}_{t=0}^T$ 
    - Family's FOC:  $\{\lambda_t, w_{1t}, w_{2t}\}_{t=0}^T$
    - Backward shooting  $t = T \rightarrow 0$ :  $\{k_{jt}, n'_{1jt}, n'_{2jt}, y_{jt}\}_{t=0}^T$  from firms' FOC.
    - Forward shooting  $t = 0 \rightarrow T$ :  $\{K_t, N_{1t}, N_{2t}, Y_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^T$  integrated by  $\mu(\epsilon, n_1; s)$ .
    - If  $\sup |\hat{r}_t - r_t| \leq \epsilon \rightarrow$  convergence, otherwise  $\hat{r}_t = (1 - \gamma)r_t + \gamma\hat{r}_t$

## Appendix

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